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STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: DIVERSITY,
CONSENSUS, AND UNRESOLVED POLICY ISSUES
Richard S. Frase*
State sentencing guidelines systems differ in their goals, scope of coverage, design, and operation. There are also many similarities,suggesting a
substantialdegree of consensus on some issues. This Essay surveys the field
of state guidelines systems to identify critical areas of diversity and consensus-both in guidelines design and in the philosophical and policy goals of
guidelines reform. For states considering adopting guidelines or modifying
an existing guidelines system, the varying approachesfound in existing systents provide a rich menu of reform options. At the same time, the Supreme
Court's recent Blakely jurisprudencehas provided both the necessity and the
opportunity to reexamine many of the most fundamental sentencing policy
issues underlyingguidelines reforms. To assistpolicymakers and scholars in
their evaluation of these difficult issues, this Essay identifies and analyzes
several of the most salient guidelinespolicy choices about which no consensus
has yet been reached, and suggests avenues for future research. These issues
include resolving conflicting aims of punishment, determining the role that
existing resource constraintsshould play in the making of sentencingpolicy,
evaluating competing enforcement methods for guidelines rules, deciding
whether to retain parole release discretion, and determining the extent to
which guidelines should regulate intermediate sanctions, misdemeanor sentencing, revocation of probation and postprison release, and prosecutorial
charging decisions.
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INTRODUCTION

Sentencing guidelines have been adopted in at least eighteen states
and the District of Columbia, but the approaches taken are almost as numerous as the jurisdictions adopting them. State guidelines systems differ
in their goals, scope of coverage, design, and operation. There are also
many similarities, suggesting a substantial degree of consensus on some
issues. These similarities also suggest that states can learn and "borrow"
from other states; to use a well-worn comparative law metaphor, donor
and recipient systems are sufficiently compatible to permit viable "legal
transplants."' At the same time, the many differences among these systems provide a rich menu of reform options. The differences also reflect
important unresolved policy issues in the relatively young field of structured sentencing.
These reform options and areas of policy disagreement have taken
on new importance in light of the Supreme Court's recent Booker2 and
Blakely decisions,3 which increased the procedural requirements for an
upward departure from a legally binding guidelines recommendation.
Whatever the ultimate scope of this revolution in sentencing procedure,
it is clear that some features of some forms of guidelines will be subject to
stricter constitutional requirements, or in Justice O'Connor's terms, a
"constitutional tax." 4 But legislators, other policymakers, and sentencing
reformers cannot simply discard these features without making a judgment about how valuable they are-is the tax worth paying?
1. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78
Cal. L. Rev. 539, 551 (1990) [hereinafter Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice]; id. at
547-48 (citing A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 21-35
(1974)).
2. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
3. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
4. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Some observers undoubtedly believe that no version of guidelines
sentencing is worth salvaging. On this view, the Blakely and Booker decisions would be a blessing in disguise if they resulted in the repeal or
emasculation of all guidelines reforms. The federal guidelines in particular have been subject to widespread criticism. 5 But even the federal
guidelines have their defenders, and not just among conservatives and
prosecutors; an early draft of "consensus points" among non-Justice Department members of the American Bar Association's Blakely Task Force
begins with the assumption that the federal system is better off with sentencing guidelines than without them. 6 Moreover, state sentencing
guidelines reforms have enjoyed much broader support, and reactions to
Blakely have focused on how to preserve these guidelines while meeting
the new procedural requirements. 7 State guidelines are popular because
they have proven more effective than alternative sentencing regimes as a
means to promote consistency and fairness, set priorities in the use of
limited correctional resources, and manage the growth in prison populations.' For these reasons, guidelines continue to be adopted in the states,
and the most recent model sentencing standards have recommended an
approach based on the best features of these state systems. 9
Although full compliance with Blakely's procedural requirements
would not be difficult,' 0 some states may prefer to avoid these requirements entirely. There seem to be a number of ways to "Blakely-proof' a
guidelines system to avoid the upward-departure problem identified in
that case.' 1 For example: (1) Since the Blakely decision appeared to ex5. See generally Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 72-99 (1996) [hereinafter Tonry,
Sentencing Matters].
6. ABA Blakely Task Force, Points of Consensus Among Non-DOJ Members on Long
Term Solution (Dec. 8, 2004) (unpublished draft, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
7. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Individual State Responses to Blakely v. Washington,
at http://www.ussc.gov/STATES/blakely.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
8. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the
Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 69, 75 (1999)
[hereinafter Frase, Retrospective]; Am. Law Inst., Report, Model Penal Code: Sentencing
48-50 (Kevin R. Reitz reporter, Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/
ALIPROJMPC03.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter MPC Sentencing
Report]; Tonry, Sentencing Matters, supra note 5, at 25-64, 71.
9. ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice Sentencing xxi (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter ABA
Standards]; MPC Sentencing Report, supra note 8, at 46-50.
10. See Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional
Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1109-13 (2005) [hereinafter Reitz,
Sentencing Conundrum] (discussing experience in Kansas, where state courts anticipated
Blakely by several years).
11. See id. at 1113-18 (discussing voluntary guidelines and parole retention as ways to
"avoid" Blakely's procedural requirements); Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated
Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington-PracticalImplications for State Sentencing Systems,
Pol'y & Prac. Rev. (Vera Inst. of Justice), Aug. 2004, at 1, 2, available at http://
www.vera.org/publicationpdf/242-456.pdf (discussing various ways for states "to cure
Blakely ills").
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empt traditional indeterminate sentencing regimes from the new procedural requirements, "voluntary" guidelines systems appear to be exempt. 12 This is also the import of Justice Breyer's opinion in Booker,
holding that the federal guidelines must be deemed "voluntary" until
Congress acts to specify its preferred mode of compliance with the
Court's new constitutional requirements.' 3 (2) Courts and commentators in Michigan and Pennsylvania have stated that upward departures
under the guidelines in those states are exempt from Blakely because the
guidelines retain parole release discretion, and only set the minimum
term to be served before parole eligibility.1 4 (3) All upward "departures"
could be eliminated by a variety of means, the most prominent proposal
being to adopt "topless" guidelines-retaining the existing lower end of
each guidelines range but replacing the top end with the statutory maximum penalty. 15 (4) Most upward departures could be eliminated by
12. See Benge v. State, No. 137, 2004 Del. LEXIS 506, at *2 (Nov. 12, 2004) (holding
Blakely inapplicable to the Delaware Guidelines because they are "voluntary and nonbinding"); Reitz, Sentencing Conundrum, supra note 10, at 1106-07.
13. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-68 (2005) (Breyer, J., opinion of the
Court). Justice Breyer's analysis of the "remedy" issue also implies that the question might
be jurisdiction-specific: What short-term solution-voluntary guidelines, total invalidity of
the guidelines, a Blakely-compliant "graft"-would this jurisdiction's legislature prefer? See
id. at 757 ("'We answer the remedial question by looking to legislative intent."). A further
uncertainty involves the meaning of Justice Breyer's standard of appellate review for
"reasonableness," id. at 765-67; such review, or any more deferential standard, will
apparently not create a Blakely problem for a voluntary guidelines system. See infra text
accompanying notes 41-45, 141-142.
14. See, e.g., People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 286 n.14 (Mich. 2004) (stating that
indeterminate sentencing in Michigan is unaffected by Blakely); Commonwealth v. Pugh,
67 Pa. D. & C.4th 458, 463 (Ct. C.P. 2004) (holding Pennsylvania indeterminate sentencing
system unaffected by Blakely); Pa. Comm'n on Sentencing, Impact of Blakely v. Washington
in Pennsylvania, at http://pcs.la.psu.edu (last updated June 30, 2004) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54
Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 66-67, on file with the Columbia Law
Review). This argument analogizes these guidelines' minimum terms to the mandatory
minimum sentence laws upheld in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), and
assumes that the latter case will not be overruled. This assumption may be incorrect. See,
e.g., Reitz, Sentencing Conundrum, supra note 10, at 1097 & n.54 (noting possibility that
Justice Breyer, who voted with majority in Harris,might vote differently should similar case
arise after Booker); Jon Wool, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington-Legal
Considerations for State Sentencing Systems, Pol'y & Prac. Rev. (Vera Inst. of Justice),
Sept. 2004, at 1, 7 n.36, available at http://www.vera.org/publication-pdf/250_477.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Whether the additional weight of the Blakely
decision will be sufficient to foster a majority to overrule Harris is an open question."); see
also id. at 7 (questioning whether parole-eligibility guidelines are Blakely-compliant even if
Harris is not overruled).
15. See Frank Bowman, Memorandum Presenting a Proposal for Bringing the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 364,
367 (2004). A similar but even more drastic approach would likewise recognize no upper
limits other than the statutory maximum, but would replace the existing lower end with a
mandatory minimum term. Another way to avoid upward departures is by means of "top
down" or "inverted" guidelines-the statutory maximum would become the presumptive
sentence, which could be mitigated by showing the absence of what were previously
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greatly increasing the top end of each guidelines range. Each of these
alternatives sacrifices sentencing policy and reform goals implicit in certain features of some guidelines systems. How important are those goals?
Are "voluntary" guidelines weaker or otherwise less desirable than legally
enforceable ones? What advantages and disadvantages accompany the retention of parole release discretion? How broad should sentencing
ranges be? Blakely and its follow up cases will provide both the necessity
and the opportunity to reexamine many of the most fundamental sentencing policy issues underlying guidelines reforms in the federal system
and the states. These issues must also be examined by any jurisdiction
that is considering whether and in what form to adopt guidelines. This
Essay seeks to assist policymakers and scholars in these assessments. It
first surveys the field of state sentencing guidelines systems to identify
critical areas of diversity and consensus-both in guidelines design and in
the philosophical and policy goals of guidelines reform. The Essay then
identifies and analyzes several of the most important guidelines policy
choices about which no consensus has yet been reached, and suggests
avenues for future research that will assist states confronting these difficult decisions.
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows. Part I provides
an overview of the guidelines systems adopted during the past twenty-five
years, and describes their principal similarities and differences. Part II
identifies some of the critical, unresolved theoretical and policy questions
concerning the philosophical and political purposes that underlie the varied approaches states have taken, argues in support of the principle of
limiting retributivism, and identifies the limits of that principle. Part III
addresses some of the most significant policy and structural design
choices that states face when considering adoption or reform of a guidelines system, and suggests avenues of research by which academics and
others can contribute to thoughtful decisionmaking by policymakers
faced with such difficult choices. The Conclusion reflects on what we
have learned from a quarter century of experience with guidelines sentencing in the states, and on future prospects for research and policy
development.
I. SUMMARY OF GUIDELINES SYSTEMS

In 1980 Minnesota became the first jurisdiction to implement sentencing guidelines developed by a permanent sentencing commission, an
idea that had been proposed by federal judge Marvin Frankel in the early
1970s. 16 A number of other states had previously experimented with
considered aggravating factors. Wool & Stemen, supra note 11, at 9. All these approaches,
like the second alternative listed in the text, assume, perhaps incorrectly, that the Court
will not overrule or substantially narrow its ruling in Harris.
16. Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 118-24 (1973).
Several bills to create a guidelines system were introduced in Congress in the 1970s, but
the federal enabling statute was not passed until 1984. The guidelines went into effect in
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state-wide, judicially enacted, voluntary guidelines,' 7 and one of these
states (Utah) later created a legislatively mandated sentencing commission. Beginning in 1980, the Alaska Court of Appeals began to issue legally binding sentencing guidelines, or benchmarks, for certain crimes,
but a permanent sentencing commission has never been established.' 8
As of late 2004, at least eighteen states and the District of Columbia were
using some sort of jurisdiction-wide sentencing guidelines system, and
guidelines reforms were being considered in a number of other states. 19
Most current guidelines states are members of the National Association of Sentencing Commissions (NASC), whose website 20 lists contact
persons and sometimes a link to the website for individual state sentencing commissions. 21 The following summary 22 is based on the NASC website and its references, previous state guidelines surveys conducted by the

late 1987, but were not applied in all courts until their constitutionality was upheld in
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
17. See Michael Tonry, Structured Sentencing, 10 Crime & Just. 267, 276-82 (1988)
[hereinafter Tonry, Structured Sentencing] (describing early efforts in various states).
18. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
19. This qualified statement ("at least") reflects an important caveat. Documenting
the current status, provisions, and impact of state guidelines systems-or even their initial
or continued existence-is a challenging task. In many states the guidelines themselves
are not accessible on Lexis/Nexis or Westlaw since they are not formally enacted as statutes
or administrative regulations.
20. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, National Association of State Sentencing Commissions,
at http://www.ussc.gov/states.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter NASC Website].
21. However, this information is not always current. For example, as of March 22,
2005, the contact information had not been updated sinceJune 2003, the posted web links
for Kansas, Michigan, and North Carolina were incorrect or not in operation, and no
contact information was given for New Mexico. As of that date, websites existed for the
Kansas, North Carolina, and New Mexico commissions. Kan. Sentencing Comm'n, at
http://www.accesskansas.org/ksc (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); N.C. Court System,
Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission, at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/
Councils/spac/Default.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); N.M. Sentencing Comm'n, at
http://www.nmsc.state.nm.us (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). No website existed for the
Michigan Commission, but that state's guidelines were available online. Mich. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (2005), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/mji/resources/
sentencing-guidelines/sg.htm. The NASC website also provides access to The Sentencing
Guideline (formerly titled Sentencing Commission News), an NASC newsletter that
includes reports on state guidelines developments from March 1995 through February
2005. Nat'l Ass'n of State Sentencing Comm'ns, NASC Newsletters, at http://www.ussc.
gov/states/statnews.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter NASC Newsletters].
22. An earlier version of this summary appeared in Frase, Retrospective, supra note 8,
at 69-72.
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author and others, 23 and various published and unpublished state-spe24
cific reports.
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES SYSTEMS
Major Structural
Features

Juri sdicton
Utah
Alas ka
Mini n.
Pa.
Md.
Fla.
Mic t.
Washh.
Del.

Permanent
Initial Effec- Sentencing
tive Date
Comm'n

Resource
Impact
Assessments

01/1979
01/1980
05/1980
07/1982
07/1983
10/1983
01/1984
07/1984
10/1987

1983

1993

/
/
1996
until 1998
1995-2002

/
some
1996
1988-1998
1995-1997
/
/

Fede ral

11/1987

V

some

Or.
Ten, n.
Va.

11/1989
11/1989
01/1991

/
until 1995
1995

/
until 1995
1995

V

V

1993 ABA
Stan dards
Ran.
Ark.
N.C.
Ohio
Mo.
Wis.
[11 crimes]
D.C. [pilot]

"

07/1993
01/1994
10/1994
07/1996
03/1997
1985-1995
02/2003
06/2004

"

Also Regulates

Appeals or
Other
Parole
InterEnforceRelease
mediate
ment
Abolished Sanctions
reasons
"
"
some
reasons
some
some, 1999
V
reasons

Misdemeanor
Offenses

some

some

1994

/
/

Revocation
of Probanon

Supervised
Rel./Parole
some

mostly
"ome

/
/
1990

some
some
,/

V"

some

/
some
reasons

some
1995

/
/
some

/

./

./

some
some
some

V
some
some

some

V,
reasons
some

some
some

some
some

some

A. Guidelines Varieties
The accompanying table summarizes the sentencing guidelines systems currently in effect in eighteen states and the District of Columbia,
showing when they were first implemented and whether they include cer23. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and
Federal Reformers, 6 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 123 (1993) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing
Guidelines in the States]; Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S.
Sentencing Practices, in Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries 222, 259-92
(Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001); Kevin R. Reitz, The Status of Sentencing
Guideline Reforms in the United States, in Penal Reform in Overcrowded Times 31
(Michael Tonry ed., 2001); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Commissions and Their
Guidelines, 17 Crime & Just. 137 (1993); Tonry, Structured Sentencing, supra note 17;
Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Justice, NCJ 169270, 1996 National Survey of
State Sentencing Structures (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/169270.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Bureau ofJustice Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
National Assessment of Structured Sentencing (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffiles/strsent.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Rachel E. Barkow,
Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 771-98 (2005) (discussing state sentencing
commissions); 20 L. & Pol'y, Nos. 3 & 4 (1998) (articles on structured sentencing); 6 Fed.
Sent'g Rep., No. 3 (1993) (reports on guidelines in effect or being considered in Alaska,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin).
24. Many state-specific reports can be found in Overcrowded Times, a bimonthly
newsletter published by Michael Tonry from March 1990 through December 1999, and in
the Federal Sentencing Reporter.
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tain key structural features. For comparison, the table also includes the
federal sentencing guidelines as well as the model recommended in the
most recent version of the American Bar Association's revised standards
for sentencing. 25 A similar model, containing all of the key features
shown in the table, has also been proposed in the early drafts of the project to amend the sentencing and corrections provisions of the Model
Penal Code. 2 6 The adoption of commission-based guidelines is also
under consideration in at least six states not listed in the table: Alabama,
27
Georgia, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.
A number of states, including Connecticut, Maine, Texas, Colorado, Nevada, New York, and Montana, have considered guidelines and chosen
28
not to adopt them.
As shown in the first column of the table, four guidelines states do
not have a permanent sentencing commission. Alaska had a temporary
commission from 1990 to 1993, but never a permanent one.29 Alaska's
guidelines consist of legislatively prescribed presumptive sentences for
certain serious and repeat offenses and sentencing benchmarks imposed
by decisions of the Alaska Court of Appeals for other crimes. 30 In Florida, Michigan, and Tennessee, the guidelines were written by commissions that were later abolished. Where they exist, state sentencing commissions are more widely representative than the federal commission,
typically including judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, correctional officials, public members, and sometimes legislators. 31 There are also major variations in the duties, staffing, and budget of state commissions, and
in the role of the commission relative to the legislature. 3 2 For example,
the Minnesota enabling statute gave the commission relatively little guidance and provided that the Commission's initial guidelines would be25. ABA Standards, supra note 9. The standards themselves (without commentary)
were also published in 52 Crim. L. Rep. 2353, 2353-70 (1993).
26. Model Penal Code: Sentencing arts. 6, 7 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004); MPC
Sentencing Report, supra note 8, appx. b.
27. The most recent developments in these states are reported in recent issues of The
Sentencing Guideline. NASC Newsletters, supra note 21. Information on developments in
New Mexico is also available online. N.M. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 21 (listing
latest reports of commission).
28. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 8, at 70. The situation in Nevada is unclear.
Compare Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.0123 (2001) (creating advisory commission on sentencing),
with http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/Interim/NonLeg/Sentencing (last visited Feb. 27,
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (Nevada Legislature website listing Advisory
Commission on Sentencing as inactive). As noted below, Louisiana and Wisconsin enacted
but then repealed their guidelines, although Wisconsin reinstituted guidelines for certain
crimes in 2003. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
29. Teresa White Carns, Sentencing Reform in Alaska, 6 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 134, 134
(1993).
30. Id. at 134-35.
31. For discussion of variations in the design and powers of sentencing commissions,
see Barkow, supra note 23, at 735-98.
32. See generally id.; Symposium, A Decade of Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting the
Role of the Legislature, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 181 (1993).
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come effective unless the legislature voted otherwise; in later years the
legislature reclaimed some of the authority it had delegated, but the Minnesota Commission still retains primary control over the formulation of
statewide sentencing policy.3 3 In contrast, the Arkansas enabling statute
provides a detailed mandate, 3 4 and in Washington State the legislature
35
has dominated the guidelines revision process.
The remaining seven columns in the table summarize important
structural variations in state guidelines systems related to their functioning, degree of enforceability, and scope. In all states with permanent sentencing commissions, the commission (or occasionally another state
agency) assesses the resource impact of proposed sentencing guidelines
and statutes, in particular, the predicted effect on prison populations.
The greater uniformity of guidelines sentencing makes such impact assessment more accurate than is possible in an indeterminate sentencing
system, and the research and planning capacities of a permanent sentencing commission provide the necessary data and staff. Impact assessments
have even been conducted by commissions that are not legally required
or mandated to do so. 36 These assessments are also recommended by the
ABA sentencing standards and the proposed revisions to the Model Penal
37
Code.
The next column in the table indicates which guidelines are legally
binding and enforced by appellate review or otherwise. In seven states
(Utah, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, Arkansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin)
and the District of Columbia, guidelines are "voluntary" and not subject
to appeal. But there are several varieties of "voluntary" guidelines. In
some of these states judges are required to give reasons for departure
from the guidelines.38 Moreover, "compliance rates" in some voluntary
guidelines jurisdictions are quite high,3 9 which suggests that in some jurisdictions peer pressure or other informal processes may effectively substitute for appellate review. For example, in Virginia, trial court judges
must be periodically reappointed by the legislature, and many judges ap33. See generally Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003,
32 Crime & Just. 131, 153-70 (2005) [hereinafter Frase, Minnesota Guidelines]
(describing legislative involvement in sentencing since enactment of Minnesota
guidelines).
34. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-90-801 to -804 (Michie Supp. 1993).
35. David Boemer & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28
Crime &Just. 71, 98 (2001).
36. Such assessments have been made in Pennsylvania since 1988. E-mail from Mark
Bergstrom, Director of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, to Richard S. Frase
(July 7, 2000) (on file with author).
37. Barkow, supra note 23, at 809.
38. See Wool & Stemen, supra note 11, at 5 (identifying Arkansas, Delaware,
Maryland, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia as voluntary guidelines states requiring judges
to state reasons for departure).
39. Barkow, supra note 23, at 795 n.354 (noting seventy-nine percent compliance rate
in Virginia in 2003).
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parently fear that a high departure rate will jeopardize their
40
reappointment.
There are also several varieties of "legally binding" guidelines. In
Pennsylvania, sentence appeal is available but the standard of review is
highly deferential. 41 However, Pennsylvania may have found another way
to encourage judicial compliance with guidelines recommendations:
Since 1999, judges' departure rates have been made public, and this
change appears to have slightly increased compliance rates. 4 2 In North
Carolina, judges have very broad discretion to sentence within the presumptive, aggravated, or mitigated sentencing ranges and sentences are
rarely reversed on appeal. 4 3 Appellate review is also limited in Florida,
Ohio, and Tennessee. 4 4 The other states listed in the table have more
active appellate review, which, particularly in Kansas, Minnesota, and
Washington, has generated a substantial body of substantive appellate
case law. But trial courts in these states still retain considerable discretion, as to both the type and the severity of sanctions; appellate review in
these states does not appear to have limited trial court discretion as severely as in the federal system. 45 It is unclear which, if any, of the varying
state appellate review standards corresponds to the "reasonableness" standard approved in Justice Breyer's Booker opinion.
The last five columns in the table reveal substantial variation in the
decisions each system seeks to regulate, including whether the guidelines
abolish parole release discretion, regulate the use of intermediate sanctions, apply to sentencing of misdemeanor crimes, or regulate decisions
about the revocation of probation or revocation of postprison parole or
40. See Nancy J. King & Roosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A
Three-State Study, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 885, 916-18 (2004) (describing "judicial apprehension
that . . . [guidelines] departures would be considered negatively by the legislature at
reelection").
41. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1441, 1471-80 (1997)
[hereinafter Reitz, Sentence Appeals].
However, recent cases suggest that the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which hears first-level appeals, may be shifting to a less
deferential approach. See Chanenson, supra note 14 (manuscript at 71-72 &
nn.280-287).
42. Pa. Comm'n on Sentencing, 2000 Annual Data Report fig.M (2002), available at
http://pcs.a.psu.edu/2000%2OReport-Tables-Only.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (chart showing that overall rates of guidelines "conformity" were slightly higher in
1999 and 2000 than in 1998). Since 1996, Washington State has also published judgespecific sentencing data. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 35, at 107.
43. Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina,
1980-2000, 29 Crime & Just. 39, 94 (2002). However, North Carolina judges may not go
outside the aggravated and mitigated ranges, so more extreme durational departures are
not permitted. Id. at 78-79.
44. See David Diroll, Ohio Adopts Determinate Sentencing, Overcrowded Times,
Aug. 1995, at 1, 10 (discussing appellate review under Ohio truth-in-sentencing law); Frase,
Retrospective, supra note 8, at 70-71 (Florida and Tennessee).
45. See Reitz, Sentence Appeals, supra note 41, at 1458-71 (discussing appellate
review in five states and federal system).
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supervised release. Eleven guidelines states and the District of Columbia
have abolished parole release discretion for all or most felons, usually
substituting limited "good time" credits for inmates who obey prison
rules. Seven states retain parole for all or most offenses, and use guidelines only to regulatejudges' decisions about the imposition and duration
of prison sentences. In some of these states the judge's sentence only sets
the minimum prison term before the offender becomes eligible for parole release; in other states the judge's sentence sets the maximum term
the offender would serve if not released earlier by the parole board; 46 in
Utah, the judge's sentence sets the "recommended" term. 47 Some parole
retention states have separate guidelines specifying when offenders will
ordinarily be released or considered for release. 48
Twelve states and the federal system have guidelines regulating some
aspect of decisions about the use of intermediate sanctions such as jail
sentences, residential or outpatient treatment, home detention, intensive
supervision, drug and alcohol use monitoring, community service, restitution, and fines. This feature is also recommended by the American Bar
Association standards and the early drafts of Model Penal Code revisions. 49 However, as discussed more fully in Part III, no existing guidelines system regulates intermediate sanctions to the same degree that it
regulates prison terms.
The next column in the table shows which systems use guidelines for
misdemeanor as well as felony sentencing. Only six states (along with the
federal system, the ABA Standards, and the early Model Penal Code revisions) include coverage of some or all misdemeanor crimes. There appears to be a correlation between this feature and the previous one: Six
of the seven guidelines systems that cover some or all misdemeanors also
regulate the use of intermediate sanctions. This pattern makes sense,
given the substantial overlap between typical misdemeanor sentencesjail, home detention, probation, fines, community service, and restitu50
tion-and typical conditions of probation in felony cases.
46. The Michigan and Pennsylvania guidelines set the minimum term, see supra note
14 and accompanying text; Maryland's guidelines set maximum terms, see Charles F.
Wellford & Clair Souryal, An Examination of Time-To-Serve in the Maryland State
Correctional System (Md. State Comm'n on Criminal Sentencing Policy), Feb. 4, 1990, at
http://www.msccsp.org/publications/timetoserve.html
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (studying difference between judicially imposed sentences and actual time served).
47. Under Utah's unique guidelines, which are advisory to the parole board as well as
the courts, the recommended prison term is the "typical length of stay" in prison. Utah
Adult Sentencing Guidelines Manual 8 (2004), available at http://www.sentencing.utah.
gov/guidelines/adult/manual2004.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
48. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of Corr., Parole from Past to Present (Feb. 6, 2003), at
http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,1607,7-119-1435-61290-,00.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing Michigan parole guidelines).
49. ABA Standards, supra note 9, §§ 18-3.12, 18-4.4; Model Penal Code: Sentencing
§§ 6A.06, 6B.02(6) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004).
50. See infra text accompanying note 177 (comparing regulation of serious
misdemeanor sentences to that of lesser felony sentences).
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The last two columns in the table indicate which jurisdictions have
guidelines regulating aspects of the decision to revoke probation, postprison supervised release, or parole in guidelines states that retain parole
release discretion. Only about half of the jurisdictions have such guidelines, and most of these jurisdictions only regulate the duration of cus51
tody imposed upon revocation, not the revocation decision itself.
Many important structural variations among guidelines systems are
not shown in the table. For example, Delaware, Florida, and Ohio use
"narrative" or "point system" guidelines rather than the standard two-dimensional grid of offense severity by criminal history or offender risk
score. 52 In a number of states, certain offenses have a separate grid or
grids. 53 Guidelines grids also vary in such details as the number of cells,
breadth of cell ranges, whether distinct "mitigated" and "aggravated" sentencing ranges are provided, and in the latter case, whether existing statutory maximum prison terms are retained to limit upward departures or
54
are replaced by the upper end of an aggravated sentencing range.
Some guidelines permit two or more disposition options for a given case,
such as prison and restrictive intermediate sanctions. A few states include
recommendations as to the choice among sentencing purposes. There
are also major variations in how criminal history is defined, scored, and
weighted, 55 the rules governing consecutive or otherwise enhanced sentencing of multiple current offenses, the nature and extent of listed factors that permit or do not permit departure, and the extent to which
statutorily based mandatory minimum prison terms determine or override guidelines rules.
51. In Table 1, "regulation" of probation revocation does not include guidelines
specifying the same prison term on revocation as the judge could have imposed originally
without a durational departure. See, e.g., Or. Sentencing Guidelines R. 213-010-0002
(2003), codified at Or. Admin. R. 213-010-0002 (2004), available at http://
www.ocjc.state.or.us/SG.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Or.
Sentencing Guidelines] (providing for prison term upon revocation up to maximum
presumptive term which could have been imposed initially).
52. See, e.g., Del. Benchbook: 2003-2004, at 5-8 (2004), available at http://
www.state.de.us/cjc/PDF/Good2003BBook.better.yet.11.25.03.pdf
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Del. Benchbook] (explaining guidelines methodology).
53. See, e.g., Kan. Sentencing Guidelines Desk Reference Manual 18-19 (2004),
available at http://www.accesskansas.org/ksc/2004forms.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Kan. Sentencing Guidelines] (separate grid for drug crimes).
54. See, e.g., id. at 19 (specifying that upper number in each grid cell is for
aggravated cases, but courts may depart upward up to double the upper grid number);
Wright, supra note 43, at 78-79 (noting that in North Carolina, top of aggravated range is
maximum sentence allowed).
55. For example, in Minnesota the presumptive prison duration for the highest
criminal history category is, on average, about two times the duration for the lowest
criminal history score. Minn. Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary § IV (2004),
available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/sentencing_.guidelines.htm#guidelines (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Minn. Sentencing Guidelines] (sentencing
grid). In Kansas, the average ratio is over three to one. Kan. Sentencing Guidelines, supra
note 53, appx. G at 2 (sentencing grid for nondrug offenses).
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State guidelines systems also differ somewhat in the nature and priority of their punishment and sentencing reform goals. Adoption of a
guidelines system is always motivated at least in part by a desire to make
sentencing more uniform and to eliminate unwarranted disparities, but
some jurisdictions, especially those with voluntary guidelines or those retaining parole discretion, give this objective much less weight. Another
goal inherent in commission-based guidelines sentencing is to promote
more rational sentencing policy formulation-decisionmaking that is at
least partially insulated from short term political pressures and is comprehensive and informed by data. 56 But states differ substantially in their
levels of funding of and deference to the commission. States that abolished parole release discretion and substituted limited "good time" credits were seeking not only to reduce disparity but also to achieve "truth in
sentencing," the notion that the length of prison sentences imposed by
courts should correspond closely to the amount of time inmates actually
serve. However, guidelines systems differ substantially in how closely they
match sentences imposed and served. In Minnesota, for example, offenders receive good time credit of up to one-third of their guidelines prison
term. 57 But in the federal system and many states, the sentence reduction for good conduct in prison cannot exceed fifteen percent. 58
A few jurisdictions have more or less "descriptive," or historically
based, guidelines 59: Recommended sentences reflect existing sentencing
norms and the goal is simply to get judges to apply these norms more
consistently. But even these states usually make some changes in prior
norms-especially to reduce racial disparities. Other states, with "prescriptive" guidelines, usually seek to increase sentence severity for certain
offenses, particularly violent and drug crimes. Several states, including
Minnesota and Kansas, explicitly based their guidelines on retributive, or
just deserts, theories of punishment, with increased emphasis on the severity of the current offense and less on offender characteristics. 60 But
these and other guidelines states still leave substantial room for offenderbased sentences designed to achieve crime control purposes, applying a
"limiting retributive" model. 6 1 For example, under Minnesota's "modi56. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 8, at 72-73.
57. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244.01(8) (West 2003).
58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2000) (limiting availability of good time credit to
fifty-four days per calendar year).
59. See D.C. Advisory Comm'n on Sentencing, 2002 Annual Report appx. A, tbl.A-1
(2001), available at http://acs.dc.gov/acs/lib/acs/pdf/2002.Appendix.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin have descriptive guidelines).
60. See, e.g., Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Report to the Legislature 9 (Jan.
1, 1980) (explicidy basing sentencing grid on "modified just deserts approach"); David J.
Gottlieb, Kansas Adopts Guidelines, 6 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 158, 158-59 (1993). However, the
purported emphasis on just deserts in Kansas is contradicted by the strong weight given to
criminal history under that state's guidelines. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 96-103 (discussing limiting retributivism).
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fled just deserts" approach, rehabilitation, reintegration, and offender
risk management remain very important goals, pursued primarily by varying the conditions of probation. 62 The determination of these conditions
is not regulated under the Minnesota guidelines, and almost eighty percent of felony sentences are to probation. 63 Moreover, appellate case law
permits judges to depart from presumptive prison or probation sentences
on the basis of the defendant's particular "amenability" or
"unamenability" to probation-a concept that at least implicitly includes
assessments of rehabilitation potential and public safety. 64 Other guidelines states recognize similar "amenability" concepts and generally permit
judges and corrections officials to consider offender treatment needs and
risk when setting the conditions of probation or postprison supervised
release. 6 5 Moreover, recommended prison sentences under sentencing
guidelines systems have always given substantial emphasis to the defendant's prior record-a factor that has very little significance under a just
66
deserts theory.
Guidelines systems, once enacted, do not remain static. As shown in
the table above, Utah, Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia began with judicially developed guidelines and later established a permanent, legislatively mandated sentencing commission. Delaware's, Virginia's, and Wisconsin's initial guidelines retained traditional parole release discretion,
which was later abolished. Michigan's guidelines were initially voluntary,
but became enforceable via sentence appeals in 1999. Several of the earlier guidelines states (Utah, Maryland, Florida, Michigan, and Virginia)
began using resource impact assessments in later years. In 1994, Pennsylvania added provisions regulating the use of intermediate sanctions.
On the other hand, two states implemented guidelines but then repealed them. The Louisiana guidelines were in effect from 1992 to
62. See Minn. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 55, § III.A.2 (listing "retribution,
rehabilitation, public protection, restitution, deterrence, and public condemnation of
criminal conduct" as penal objectives to be considered in establishing conditions of
probation).
63. Frase, Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 33, at 193 fig.5 (showing prison sentence
rates of slightly more than twenty percent in most years; all nonprison sentences are to
probation, which often includes jail time as a condition).
64. Id. at 155. Offenders are also encouraged to pursue rehabilitative programs in
prison. Although the 1978 guidelines enabling act specified that prison treatment
programs would henceforth be entirely voluntary, a 1992 amendment to the act allows
corrections officials to withhold "good time" credits from offenders who refuse to
participate in prison programs. Id. at 164.
65. See, e.g., N.C. Structured Sentencing Training and Reference Manual 15 (2004),
available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/training
andreferencemanual2004.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter N.C.
Sentencing Manual] (including as mitigating factors "good character," successful
completion of treatment program, family support, "support system in the community,"
"positive employment history," and "good treatment prognosis").
66. See infra text accompanying notes 104-116 (discussing weight given to prior
record under just deserts theory).
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As shown in the table, Wisconsin repealed its initial guidelines in
1995 but reinstituted guidelines for certain crimes in 2003.68 In other
states, guidelines survived but grew weaker or narrower over time. Sentencing commissions, although not the guidelines themselves, were abolished in Florida, Michigan, and Tennessee. 69 In addition, the binding
force of Florida's guidelines was limited in 1995 when trial judges were
given unreviewable discretion to impose any sentence between the minimum recommended guidelines term and the statutory maximum. 70 In
1994, Oregon voters approved a ballot measure that turned many of the
recommended guidelines prison sentences into mandatory minimum
prison terms, and the legislature substituted a citizen policy board for the
71
sentencing commission.
The probability that a guidelines system will be repealed or substantially weakened appears to be related in part to the scope of the systemvoluntary guidelines and those that retain parole seem more likely to be
totally or partially repealed. The two total repeal states, Louisiana and
Wisconsin, each had voluntary guidelines for judges and also retained
parole at the time of repeal. Likewise, two of the three states that abolished their sentencing commissions, Michigan and Tennessee, had retained parole. Perhaps the narrower scope of these reforms made them
appear less worthwhile, or reflected weaker support for them at the
outset.
Sentencing reform goals have also evolved over time. Although offender risk management has always been at least an implicit goal of most
guidelines systems, as is reflected in the substantial weight these systems
give to prior criminal record, public safety has come to play an increasingly important role. For example, in 1989 the Minnesota legislature
amended the guidelines enabling statute to specify that public safety
should be the commission's "primary" consideration. 72 The legislature
then also passed numerous laws providing increased penalties for dangerous or repeat offenders. 73 Some of the newer state guidelines systems
explicitly include public safety as a goal, or provide for individualized risk
1995.67

74
assessment procedures for certain offenses.

67. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 8, at 70 tbl.
68. Wis. Sentencing Comm'n, History, at http://wsc.wi.gov/category.asp?linkcatid=34
&linkid=3&locid=10 (last modified Apr. 26, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
69. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 8, at 72 (Florida and Tennessee); E-mail from
Phoenix Hummel, Research Attorney, Michigan Courts, to Richard S. Frase (Dec. 14,
2004) (on file with author) (Michigan).
70. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 8, at 70. This change only eliminated restrictions
on judicial severity, not leniency, as evidenced by the fact that downward departure still
requires a written statement of reasons and is subject to appeal by the prosecution. Id.
71. Id.
72. 1989 Minn. Laws 290(2) (8).
73. See Frase, Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 33, at 159-62 (discussing 1989
changes to Minnesota's sentencing guidelines system).
74. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-25-2 (2004) (providing that guidelines shall secure public
safety); Wis. Sentencing Guidelines Notes § II, available at http://wsc.wi.gov/docview.asp?
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Another important reform goal that Minnesota recognized at the
outset, and that almost all other states have now adopted, is to use guidelines sentencing as a resource management tool-in particular to avoid
prison overcrowding, set priorities in the use of limited prison capacity,
and gain better control over the growth in prison populations and expenditures. Indeed, every guidelines system adopted or revised since
1983 has included resource impact assessments in some form. As state
prison populations began to shoot up in the 1980s, increasing costs and
raising problems of overcrowding and court intervention, resource management became the most important reason for adopting guidelines and
a sentencing commission. 7 5 The third edition of the ABA Standards,
adopted in 1993, reflected this shift in reform goals and the operation of
guidelines sentencing; resource management, which had not even been
mentioned in previous editions of the standards, was recognized as a central principle. 76 Resource management goals also figure prominently in
the early drafts of proposals to revise the Model Penal Code sentencing
and corrections provisions. 77 However, resource impact projections have
been used in very different ways. Some states routinely use them in the
drafting of guidelines and statutory provisions; other states use them sporadically; in the federal system they were used only in the early years, and
even then only after the guidelines had been written-as a warning to the
legislature to expand prison capacity in order to accommodate the new
rules, not as a means to avoid overcrowding, set priorities, or manage
78
prison growth.
Later guidelines systems and revisions of existing systems are also
more likely to abolish parole release discretion, regulate the use of intermediate sanctions, and regulate aspects of probation and parole revocation. Parole abolition reflected increased emphasis on the goal of truth
in sentencing, and was strongly encouraged by a 1994 federal statute providing substantial funds for prison construction to states that required
inmates convicted of serious crimes to serve at least eighty-five percent of
their sentences. 79 Regulation of intermediate sanctions and revocations
serves to reduce disparity and may also discourage unnecessary imprisonment, thus avoiding prison overcrowding and reducing prison costs.
docid=48 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (including risk
assessment evaluation in computation of guidelines sentence); Richard P. Kern &
Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with Integrated Offender Risk Assessment,
16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 165, 166-68 (2004) (describing legislatively mandated risk assessments
for nonviolent offenders and sex offenders).
75. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States, supra note 23, at 124, 126.
76. ABA Standards, supra note 9, § 18-2.3.
77. Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 1.02(2) cmt. 1 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004);
MPC Sentencing Report, supra note 8, at 49-50, 78-85.
78. See infra Part III.A (discussing varying ways in which resource impact assessments
can be used).
79. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 20102, 108 Stat. 1796, 1816 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13702 (2000)).
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Such regulation may also better promote public safety by keeping some
vulnerable offenders out of prison and increasing control and accountability for offenders who would otherwise receive less restrictive conditions
of release. Regulation of intermediate sanctions and revocations can also
serve to discourage overuse of such sanctions against low-risk offenders
("net widening") ,80 which is wasteful and may even result in increased
imprisonment when such offenders violate unnecessary release conditions and are revoked to prison.
B. Similarities
The discussion above has highlighted the many differences in the
designs and aims of state guidelines, but it is important also to note the
similarities. There are some matters about which most state systems, especially the ones implemented or revised in recent years, seem to agree.
This strong consensus suggests that certain features of guidelines sentencing have proved valuable in practice in multiple jurisdictions and should
be adopted by states designing new guidelines and retained in existing
guidelines systems.
First, there is broad agreement that sentencing must reflect a wide
variety of sentencing theories, reform goals, and systemic needs, and that
sentencing and reform purposes must and will evolve over time. Although guidelines are often viewed as deliberately, and perhaps inherently, designed to emphasize retributive goals of proportionality and uniformity, all state guidelines reforms, even at their inception, have also
given substantial weight to crime control purposes. As noted above, the
latter purposes, along with resource management and truth in sentenc81
ing, have received increased emphasis in recent years.
Second, there is strong-but not universal-agreement that sentencing guidelines need to be developed, implemented, monitored, and periodically revised by a permanent, broadly based, independent sentencing
commission. 82 One of the most important features of sentencing guidelines reforms is their research component. Most legislatively created
guidelines commissions have been charged with the responsibility of collecting and analyzing sentencing data, as background for drafting the initial guidelines and then as a means of monitoring implementation and
proposing revisions. This empirical component has become more and
more important, as states have begun to focus on resource management
goals. Prison and other resource management projections require detailed information on past and current sentencing practices, and the application of sophisticated modeling techniques. Granted, a few states
80. D.C. Advisory Comm'n on Sentencing, Report 78 (Apr. 5, 2000), available at
http://acs.dc.gov/acs/lib/acs/pdf/acs.200OSentenceRecommendations.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
81. Supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
82. As shown in Table 1, all but four guidelines states maintain a permanent
sentencing commission.
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abolished their commissions once the guidelines were in effect, but as
noted above, most of these jurisdictions either had weaker guidelines to
begin with or abolished the commission after having first substantially cut
back the scope of the guidelines. Under these circumstances there may
not be much practical difference between merely abolishing the commission and repealing the entire guidelines reform, as was done by Louisiana
and Wisconsin.
Third, there is near-universal agreement on the importance of using
the greater predictability of guidelines sentencing, and the research and
analytic capacities of a permanent commission, to prepare and publish
resource impact assessments.8 3 However, as noted earlier, guidelines ju84
risdictions differ in the way in which such assessments are used.
A fourth area of implicit consensus in guidelines states involves the
allocation of sentencing authority between various institutions and actors.
As Kevin Reitz has shown, sentencing outcomes depend on decisions
made both at the systemic level by legislatures and sentencing commissions, and at the case level by the parties, trial and appellate courts, and
corrections officials.8 5 Reitz argues that the relative influence of these
various decisionmakers needs to be kept in balance. He concludes that
the federal guidelines have concentrated too much power at the systemic
level, both in Congress and the federal sentencing commission, and in
the hands of prosecutors.8 6 He finds a better balance in state guidelines
systems, particularly in Minnesota.8 7 State guidelines have generally succeeded in obtaining and preserving broad acceptance by legislators and
practitioners; an important reason for this acceptance is that state guidelines allow substantial inputs from all systemic and case-level actors, and
avoid concentrations of sentencing power.88
A review of state guidelines provisions and their implementation
reveals a fifth area of implicit agreement: the importance of keeping
guidelines rules relatively simple. Offenders and the public need to be
able to understand the rules, and the rules must remain fairly easy for
courts and other officials to apply. Complex rules promote errors and
disparity; they also waste scarce court and attorney time. Some state
89
guidelines drafters have explicitly recognized the goal of simplicity.
The federal guidelines commission clearly did not view simplicity as a vir83. See

supra

text

accompanying

notes

36-37

(discussing

resource

impact

assessments).
84. See supra text accompanying note 78.

85. Kevin R. Reitz, Modeling Discretion in American Sentencing Systems, 20 Law &
Pol'y 389, 389-90 (1998) [hereinafter Reitz, Modeling Discretion].
86. Id. at 408-09.
87. There is strong support for that conclusion. See Frase, Minnesota Guidelines,
supra note 33, at 208 (finding support for Reitz's position in history of Minnesota's
guidelines).
88. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 8, at 74; Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the

States, supra note 23, at 123, 125-26; Reitz, Modeling Discretion, supra note 85, at 410-19.
89. Frase, Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 33, at 133, 206.
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tue, and its guidelines remain far more complex than those found in any
state.
State guidelines have remained simple, in part, because they do not
seek to regulate in detail all major aspects of sentencing. Indeed, there is
considerable consensus in the states that certain matters, such as intermediate sanctions and revocation decisions, should not be closely regulated,
and that some matters, such as misdemeanor sentencing, prosecutorial
discretion, plea bargaining, and granting of leniency in exchange for
other forms of cooperation, should not be regulated at all. Some of the
latter are covered by the federal guidelines. One of the most controversial aspects of the federal guidelines is their attempt to indirectly regulate
prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining concessions by means of the
notorious "relevant conduct" provision.9 0 State systems, in contrast, base
recommended sentences much more closely on the conviction
offense (s).91
II.

MAJOR UNRESOLVED NORMATIVE QUESTIONS

The varied approaches reflected in state guidelines provide a rich
and thus far largely unexplored field for theoretical, comparative, and
empirical research. The differences between these systems reflect, in
part, divergent approaches to certain foundational problems of sentencing reform, including normative questions about the purposes of punishment and the purposes of a guidelines sentencing system, and practical
needs and constraints, particularly those imposed by limited state resources. Many of these issues were hidden in the preguidelines era of
indeterminate sentencing 92 but must now be addressed by any state considering adoption or reform of a guidelines system. This Part of the Essay
examines several of these foundational problems and concludes that the
theory of limiting retributivism is the most useful way to resolve many of
them. The issues considered in this Part will then be used to frame the
discussion in Part III, which analyzes the difficult policy choices states
face in designing a guidelines system.
A. Conflicting Sentencing Purposes, Other Reform Goals, and Systemic Needs
Guidelines systems, like any instrument of public policy, are informed and shaped by the purposes they are intended to serve. Policymakers must make decisions or assumptions about the nature and prior90. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 (2004).
91. The federal relevant conduct enhancements, in their mandatory form, were
struck down in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746-56 (2005) (Stevens, J., opinion
of the Court) (holding unconstitutional nonjury determinations of relevant conduct
resulting in higher presumptive sentences under guidelines).
92. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability,
Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 Geo. L.J. 975
passim (1978) (cautioning sentencing reformers not to overlook hidden causes of sentence
disparity under indeterminate sentencing system).
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ity of various punishment purposes, such as retribution and
rehabilitation, reform goals independent of those purposes-for example, truth in sentencing and "transparency," 93 as well as systemic needs
and other practical considerations, such as avoidance of prison overcrowding and encouraging guilty pleas. For example, in deciding between appellate review and other methods for enforcing guidelines rules,
policymakers must make decisions or assumptions about, inter alia, the
importance of the purposes served by uniformity of sanctions, which include retribution, general deterrence, and accurate resource impact assessments, versus other purposes which are best served by more flexible
rules, such as offender risk management, restorative justice, and efficiency. Indeed, as discussed more fully in Part III, the choices between
uniformity and flexibility, and the purposes served by each, underlie most
of the major guidelines design policy choices, including the use of parole
release discretion and the regulation of intermediate sanctions, misdemeanor sentences, revocation decisions, prosecutorial discretion, and
plea bargaining.
The list of relevant sentencing purposes, reform goals, and systemic
needs is long, yet guidelines reformers often explicitly purport to embrace almost all of them. For example, the enabling statute creating the
Alabama Sentencing Commission states that the commission shall recommend changes in the state's statutes, rules, policies and practices which
will secure public safety, provide an "effective, fair, and efficient sentencing system," ensure certainty in sentencing, maintain judicial discretion
and sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentencing as appropriate, avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, promote truth in sentencing, prevent prison overcrowding and the premature release of prisoners,
encourage a wider array of sentencing options, limit the charging discretion of district attorneys, promote respect for the law, provide 'just and
adequate punishment," deter criminal conduct, impose sanctions that are
least restrictive while consistent with the protection of the public and the
gravity of the crime, and promote the rehabilitation of offenders. 94 Numerous sentencing reform and systemic goals are specified in this charge,
and most of the traditional purposes of punishment are at least implicit,
including retribution (uniformity and proportionality) and crime control
by means of deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation of dangerous
offenders. Although this list is long, it leaves out other punishment purposes and reform or systemic goals that have been widely recognized. Additional punishment goals include expressive and communicative functions, such as defining and reinforcing important societal norms,
persuading the offender of his wrongdoing, and promoting repen93. Michael Tonry, U.S. Dep't of Justice, NCJ 175721, The Fragmentation of
Sentencing and Corrections in America 6 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffilesl/nij/175721.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
94. Ala. Code § 12-25-2 (2004).

1210

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1190

tance.9 5 Other reform or systemic goals include improved rationality of
sentencing policy formulation; efficient (parsimonious) and prioritized
use of limited correctional resources; accommodation of local variations
in law enforcement needs, community values, available resources, and
available data about those resources; transparency and accountability of
policy formulation and case outcomes; recognition of victims' rights; restorative and community justice; encouraging guilty pleas and other
forms of defendant cooperation; and ensuring that sentencing rules are
fairly simple to understand and apply.
How can all of these goals be reconciled, particularly when they
often are in conflict with each other, posing difficult tradeoffs? The most
prominent conflicts are between retributive and crime control goals: An
offender's mental illness or addiction to drugs reduces his or her capacity
to obey the law, thus making the offender less blameworthy and less
deterrable, but more dangerous and in need of incapacitation and treatment; the pursuit of crime control goals premised on assessments of the
individual offender's dangerousness or amenability to treatment inevitably produce disparate sentences for equally culpable offenders. Moreover, crime control goals often conflict with each other: Increased rates of
imprisonment may increase the general deterrent effect on other wouldbe offenders, yet entering prison may make some of the incarcerated offenders substantially more dangerous and less able to cope with freedom.
Reform and systemic goals may also conflict. As discussed more fully in
Part III, the retention or adoption of "backdoor" parole releasing authority applicable to large numbers of offenders may promote efficiency by
allowing the release of offenders when changed circumstances indicate
that they are no longer dangerous, but undermines retributive values,
truth in sentencing, the accuracy of resource impact assessments, and the
self-restraint policymakers feel when there is no potential backdoor
"safety valve."
Clearly it is not possible to fully achieve all relevant purposes and
limitations in all cases; compromise is unavoidable. As I have argued in
previous writings, Norval Morris's theory of limiting retributivism appears
to be the best way to resolve the most fundamental goal conflicts, both
between retributive and crime control goals and within the latter. 96
Under this theory, retributive values of uniformity and proportionality
95. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Desert and Penance, in Principled Sentencing: Readings on
Theory and Policy 161, 165 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998)
(describing punishment as "communicative process which aims to induce repentance, selfreform and reconciliation"); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 Encyclopedia of Crime &
Justice 1282, 1286-87 (Joshua Dressier et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (describing various
punishment goals).
96. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in The Future of Imprisonment 83
passim (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) [hereinafter Frase, Limiting Retributivism] (arguing for
Morris's theory as providing superior resolution to conflicts arising between crime control
and retributive goals); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22
Crime & Just. 363 passim (1997) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing Principles] (describing
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(and perhaps also utilitarian proportionality principles 9 7 ) set upper and
lower limits on sentencing severity. Within these outer limits, other purposes and principles determine the sentence imposed in a particular
case. These other purposes and principles include not only traditional
crime control purposes such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, but also considerations of equality (uniformity) and a concept Morris calls parsimony: a preference for the least severe alternative that will
achieve the purposes of the particular sentence. 98 The parsimony principle is expressly recognized in some state guidelines9 9 and is also endorsed
in the current and prior editions of the ABA Standards. 0 0 This principle
is grounded in reasons of economy and humane treatment of offenders
and finds counterparts in many fields of American and foreign law.' 0 1
Morris's approach not only makes sense in theory, it also appears to
be the model that best describes the approach Minnesota and other
guidelines states have implicitly adopted.10 2 Because limiting retributivism reflects a reasonable hybrid approach and is the de facto choice of
most state guidelines reforms, this model has been adopted as the normative basis for the proposed revisions of the Model Penal Code sentencing
10 3
and corrections provisions.
remarkable correspondence between Morris's limiting retributive model and the theory
and practice of Minnesota's guidelines).
97. For example, sentences proportional to crime severity match public costs with
threatened social harms and also give offenders an incentive to choose less rather than
more serious crimes. For a discussion of these and other utilitarian arguments in favor of
penalties proportionate to offense seriousness, see Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to
What?, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 571, 592-96 (2005) [hereinafter Frase, Proportionality].
98. Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 59-62 (1974).
99. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-25-2(b)(5) (listing as one purpose of sentencing,
"[i]mposing sanctions which are least restrictive while consistent with the protection of the
public and the gravity of the crime"); Minn. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 55,
§ III.A.2 (urging judges to utilize least restrictive conditions consistent with objectives of
sanction).
100. Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 1.02(2)(2) (a) (iii) (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2004); Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 96, at 94-95; see also Morris, supra note
98, at 61-62 (noting ABA's earlier strong support for parsimony principle). This principle
is also explicitly recognized in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2000), but it has not been given much attention by the United States Sentencing
Commission or federal courts. The parsimony principle may play a greater role in the
future, in light of Justice Breyer's opinion in Booker, emphasizing the importance of that
section of the Act. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-65 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
opinion of the Court) (making repeated reference to § 3 553(a)).
101. See Frase, Proportionality, supra note 97, at 598-627 (discussing examples of
similar proportionality principles in American and foreign law); Frase, Sentencing
Principles, supra note 96, at 373-75 (discussing origins of parsimony concept).
102. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 96, at 84, 98-107, 112.
103. Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 1.02(2) cmt. b; MPC Sentencing Report, supra
note 8, at 36-41 (describing merits of limiting retributivism).
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B. Some Special Problems
Morris's theory does not resolve all of the conflicts between and
among punishment, reform, and systemic goals. Two of the unresolved
problems are discussed below.
1. Repeat Offenders and the Limits of Limiting Retributivism. - As was
illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent refusal to condemn California's
extreme three strikes law, 10 4 there are great difficulties in seeking to reconcile proportionality values and utilitarian sentencing goals when dealing with repeat offenders-those who have committed multiple current
offenses or who have a large number of prior convictions. Such offenders
undoubtedly pose a higher risk of reoffending, and politicians, judges,
sentencing commissions, and the public seem determined to impose very
long sentences on them. But from a retributive perspective it is fundamentally unfair to impose long sentences upon persons convicted of minor crimes; the offender has already "paid" for his prior crimes, and consecutive sentencing for multiple current offenses-which may have been
committed in a single crime spree, or reflect a single course of conduct
or moral error-can easily exaggerate the seriousness of the offender's
crimes and exceed his culpability and the need for censure, denunciation, and penal communication. These issues are most acute in the case
of multiple violent crimes; it is hard to insist on strict retributive upper
limits on punishment severity when serious, traumatic, and perhaps irreparable physical and psychic harms are involved. In such cases, one must
seriously consider not only fairness to the offender but also fairness to
potential victims.
Punishment theory is quite underdeveloped here. Even among retributivists there is no agreement on the proper weight to give to repeat
offending. Writers such as George Fletcher would give prior record no
weight, 10 5 while others, such as Andrew von Hirsch and Norval Morris,
would permit modest penalty increases for recidivists. 10 6 These unresolved tensions may help to explain not only the Supreme Court's unwillingness to impose meaningful Eighth Amendment limits on lengthy
prison terms, but also the wide variations among sentencing guidelines
systems in the handling of repeat offending, including variations in criminal history scoring, the relative weight given to prior record versus cur104. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-28 (2003). Ewing, other Eighth Amendment
cases, and various concepts of proportionality are discussed in Frase, Proportionality, supra
note 97.
105. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 460-66 (1978) (questioning
whether prior record increases an offender's culpability to any degree).
106. See Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes:
Deservedness and
Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals 77-91 (1985) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Past
or Future Crimes] (arguing repeat offenders deserve somewhat greater punishment than
first offenders); Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions, in Principled
Sentencing, supra note 95, at 191, 192 (same). See generally Julian V. Roberts, The Role
of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 Crime & Just. 303, 317-19 (1997)
(summarizing desert theories of punishment).
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rent offense severity, and the treatment of consecutive sentencing. These
issues are complex and require much more extensive analysis than can be
provided in this Essay, but it is worthwhile to consider briefly the range of
policy options available. Given the weight that most modern sentencing
systems give to repeat offending,1 0 7 it seems completely unrealistic to
hope that policymakers and the public will ever adopt the Fletcher view
that prior record is not an aggravating factor. Indeed, it is probably also
unrealistic to expect widespread adoption of von Hirsch's view, permitting very limited prior record enhancements.10 8 It is possible that policymakers and the public would accept a less restrictive version of the von
Hirsch approach, permitting substantial imputations of increased culpability and penalty enhancements based on the offender's prior record or
multiple current convictions. But how can the degree of such enhancements be specified and defended? More work needs to be done on this
question, which raises issues of immense practical and theoretical
importance.
A second option would be to concede that the real reasons for giving
repeat offenders increased punishment have nothing to do with culpability and are based on purely utilitarian goals such as a need for incapacitation arising from the increased risk of reoffending, reduced amenability
to treatment and supervision, and a greater need for deterrence of this
and similar offenders. Under this approach, if concepts of desert are to
remain as limits on maximum allowable punishment severity, the range
of desert, or in Morris's terms, "not undeserved" punishment,1 0 9 must be
quite substantial. But at some point, this relaxed version of limiting retributivism breaks down; very broad retributive proportionality limits have
little real meaning and practical value.1 10 Determining the point at
which that breakdown occurs (which may vary by offense or other offender characteristics) is a matter that requires much more thought and
perhaps also some empirical research on perceptions of fairness under
different versions of this approach. It should be noted, however, that
even within a broad range of retributive and utilitarian proportionality'
relative to crime severity, another utilitarian proportionality principle
may set further limits: Sanctions must not be more severe than necessary
to achieve their intended purposes. This principle of "parsimony," or
107. von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes, supra note 106, at 77.
108. Professor von Hirsch has rejected even the moderate criminal history
enhancements permitted under the Minnesota Guidelines. See Andrew von Hirsch,
Proportionality and Parsimony in American Sentencing Guidelines: The Minnesota and
Oregon Standards, in The Politics of Sentencing Reform 149 passim (Chris Clarkson & Rod
Morgan eds., 1995) (criticizing treatment of prior record under Minnesota guidelines).
109. Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law 151 (1982).
110. See Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 96, at 84, 104 (arguing that limiting
retributivism theory must be "kept within some limits").
111. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing utilitarian proportionality
values).
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"means proportionality," finds strong support in many areas of U.S., for112
eign, and international law.
A third way to retain meaningful proportionality limits on criminal
sentences is to divert the most troubling cases to the mental health system.11 3 Many states have taken this approach with sex offenders in recent
years, including presumptive guidelines states such as Minnesota, Washington, and Kansas, in which proportionality of sentences is seen as a very
important goal. 114 One problem with this approach is that mental health
commitments may be much more expensive than imprisonment. 1 5 This
solution is also somewhat dishonest; an offender who is sent to a secure
hospital-especially one who has just completed a lengthy prison termis being "punished" in everything but name.
Further study may reveal other ways to reconcile conflicting punishment goals in cases of repeated criminality. In any case, decisions about
sentencing repeat offenders have important implications for the design
of sentencing systems. For example, if repeat offenders receive very long
prison sentences, there may be a stronger argument for retaining the option of early release on parole. 116 On the other hand, if such high risk
offenders are instead given lengthy periods of supervised release on probation or after release from prison, it may be more important to regulate
decisions to revoke such release.
2. Symbolic or Deferred Punishment Versus the Requirement of "HardTreatment. " - Like repeat offense enhancements, suspended sentences are
widely employed in guidelines states1 17 but raise substantial goal conflicts.
Minnesota, for example, relies heavily on suspended prison terms and
suspended imposition of a prison term (deferred sentencing)-almost
eighty percent of felony sentences are suspended, or "stayed."1 18 The fre112. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
113. Some repeat offenders can also be diverted to the immigration system. That
device, as well as mental health diversions, have also been used in a number of other
Western countries. See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Perspectives on Sentencing Policy
and Research, in Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries, supra note 23, at 259,
266 [hereinafter Frase, Comparative Perspectives].
114. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.09.010 (West 2002) (summarizing legislature's
findings that existing involuntary commitment act was inadequate to deal with unique
problems of sexual predators); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (upholding
constitutionality of Kansas involuntary commitment law); Frase, Minnesota Guidelines,
supra note 33, at 165 n.17 (Minnesota).
115. See Frase, Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 33, at 212 (noting far higher cost of
civil commitment).
116. See infra Part III.C (weighing advantages and disadvantages of parole retention).
117. Washington State is one exception. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.575
(West 2000) (abolishing power to defer or suspend execution or imposition of sentence,
except for certain sex offenders). Suspended or conditional prison sentences are also
widely used in other Western countries. Frase, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 113,
at 278.
118. See Frase, Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 33, at 193 fig.5 (showing that from
1978 to 2002 only about twenty percent of felony sentences were unsuspended prison
terms).
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quent use of suspended sentences is consistent with limiting retributivism 1 19 and serves the goals of efficiency (parsimony), flexibility, and accommodation of local values and needs. But do such sentences
adequately serve other important goals? Do suspended prison terms-at
least if combined with various positive and negative conditions and a serious threat of later revocation-impose sufficient penal "consequences,"
"censure," norm reinforcement, and denunciation to meet the minimum
requirements of general and specific deterrence, just deserts (uniformity
and proportionality), and the expressive and communicative purposes of
punishment? Are revocation rates sufficiently predictable to maintain accurate resource impact assessments? There is substantial disagreement
about suspended sentences even among retributive theorists. Andrew
von Hirsch has suggested that immediate imposition and execution of
the prison sentence (in his terms, "hard treatment") may not be needed
to achieve adequate "censure"; 120 on the other hand, Antony Duff believes that actual hard treatment is required. 1 2 1 Empirical research may
be able to shed some light on this debate. How do offenders, victims, and
the general public view suspended sentences, with and without onerous
conditions and a real threat of follow-up sanctions for breach?
The resolution of these underlying normative questions has important implications for the design of a guidelines system. In particular, a
system that makes frequent use of suspended sentences will clearly have a
greater need to regulate the use of intermediate sanctions and revocation
decisions. These and other implications are discussed more fully below.

III.

DESIGN ISSUES AND CHOICES

Part I highlighted some of the significant differences that exist
among state guidelines systems. As discussed in Part II, these differences
to some extent reflect different views about the purposes of punishment,
the goals of a guidelines sentencing system, and the accommodation of
various administrative needs. These divergent goals and constraints provide the context within which to consider the critical policy and design
choices that states face when adopting or revising a guidelines system.
119. See Frase, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 113, at 278 (arguing that
suspended sentences are consistent with limiting retributivism); Frase, Sentencing
Principles, supra note 96, at 401-02 (explaining how stay revocations reflect theory of
limiting retributivism by serving utilitarian goals within limits of maximum deserved
punishment).
120. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 Crime
and Just. 55, 73-74 (1992) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Philosophy of Punishment] (arguing
that punishment does not just serve to "censure," but keeps behavior within tolerable
limits).
121. See Duff, supra note 95, at 164-65 (viewing hard treatment as "secular species of
penance" with several salutary purposes).
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This Part of the Essay discusses several such choices and suggests avenues
122
for future research to aid states in the decisionmaking process.
A. How Should Resource Impact Assessments Be Used?
Arguably the most important innovation of state guidelines systems,
and the key to their survival and effectiveness, is their use of prison and
other resource impact assessments. 123 As was noted in Part I, such assessments can be employed in quite different ways. In Minnesota they are
routinely used in the formulation of guidelines and statutory provisions;
if the impact projections show that a proposed guidelines rule or statute
will substantially increase prison populations, that proposal is likely to be
rejected or greatly narrowed in scope. 1 24 North Carolina followed a similar practice at the outset, but in recent years resource impact assessments
have been used only in response to specific legislative request. 125 In the
federal system, detailed impact assessments were used only once-after
the guidelines had been written-to advise Congress of the need to expand prison capacity in order to accommodate the new rules. 126 These
very different ways of using resource impact assessments reflect fundamental differences in guidelines reform goals. Minnesota and many
other states view these assessments as essential mechanisms for avoiding
prison overcrowding, setting priorities in the use of scarce and expensive
correctional resources, and managing the growth in prison populations
27
and expense.'
Under the Minnesota approach, impact assessments affect sentencing policy decisions at both the commission and the legislative level.
When the commission is drafting the initial guidelines or considering
proposed amendments, resources such as prison beds are assumed to be
constant, including only existing capacity and fully funded expansion
projects. A capacity constraint is imposed: Projected prison populations
may not exceed ninety-five percent of future capacity. If projections indicate that the capacity limit will be exceeded, changes are made to reduce
recommended sentences. Similar projections are applied to proposed
legislation, although in that context the legislature has more options: It
may cut back or abandon the proposed legislation, authorize funding to
expand capacity, or pursue a combination of these responses.
122. Most of these issues correspond to the major structural variations summarized in
Part I and Table 1, and are discussed in the order in which they were taken up there.
123. See Barkow, supra note 23, at 804-10 (highlighting value of resource impact
assessments to state legislatures).
124. See Frase, Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 33, at 146-47, 204-05 (discussing
Minnesota's use of resource impact assessments).
125. Telephone Interview by Rachel Anderson with Karen Jones, Senior Research &
Policy Associate, N.C. Sentencing and Policy Advisory Comm'n (Jan. 10, 2005).
126. Richard S. Frase, Lessons of State Guidelines Reforms, 8 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 39
(1995).
127. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States, supra note 23, at 124, 126.
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Of course, some believe that prison expansion should be encouraged in order to fight crime and provide employment and other benefits, especially in economically depressed rural areas,1 28 or at least to win
votes. Such proprison advocates argue that the use of a capacity constraint by the sentencing commission is unwarranted-prison populations should reflect optimum punishment policy, not an arbitrary "cap"
dictated by prior funding decisions.1 29 On this view the commission
should first decide how many people ought to be in prison, then tell the
legislature to provide any needed additional funding. But determining
optimum prison populations is a daunting task, from either ajust deserts
or a crime control perspective. Just deserts proponents concede that it is
much harder to define absolute degrees of deserved punishment than it
is to make relative, or ordinal, comparisons: This crime is more reprehensible than that one.' 30 Optimum imprisonment for crime control
purposes would require collection of data and highly complex modeling
of the effects of given punishment policies on crime rates over time, as
well as the crime control effects of spending the same money on preventive measures outside of the criminal justice system.
In the absence of such data, policymakers should not assume that
current capacity is too low. American jurisdictions already have substantial capacity to incarcerate, and a comparison of crime and incarceration
rates in other Western nations suggests that most American jurisdictions
are already making excessive use of custodial sanctions, at least for nonviolent offenders.' 3 ' The question is not whether more capacity is needed,
128. See Fox Butterfield, Study Tracks Boom in Prisons and Notes Impact on
Counties, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2004, at A19 (describing how large inmate population can
benefit depressed area because inmates are counted in census for purposes of determining
federal funding for health care and social services).
129. See Barkow, supra note 23, at 809 n.408, 810 n.416 (summarizing views
expressed in debates within ABA, and in Senate Report accompanying Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984); see also Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, The Scale of Imprisonment
206 (1991) (noting differing and unexamined assumptions about needed prison capacity).
130. von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes, supra note 106, at 43-46.
131. See, e.g., Floyd Feeney, U.S. Dep't of Justice, German and American
Prosecutions: An Approach to Statistical Comparison (1998), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/gap.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (comparing U.S.
and German sentencing policy for violent, theft, and drug crimes); Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing in Germany and the United States: Comparing Apfel with Apples 16-39 (Max
Planck Inst., 2001), available at http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/verlag/Forschaktuell/FraseEndausdruck.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding higher incarceration rate
for nonviolent offenses in U.S. notwithstanding methodological difficulty of cross-country
statistical comparison); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Laws and Practices in France, 7 Fed.
Sent'g Rep. 275, 276 (1995) (estimating U.S. adult incarceration rate at two and a half
times that of France). But cf. James P. Lynch, A Comparison of Prison Use in England,
Canada, West Germany, and the United States: A Limited Test of the Punitive Hypothesis,
79J. Crim. L. & Criminology 180 (1988) (finding that West Germany, but neither England
nor Canada, had substantially lower offense-specific incarceration rates for nonviolent
crimes than the United States). See generally Sentencing and Sanctions in Western
Countries, supra note 23.
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but rather whether better use could be made of the existing capacity.
Moreover, even if a commission could determine an optimum, higher
prison level, what assurance is there that the legislature will respond, and
do so quickly? Expansion of prison capacity is a slow process, and legislatures often fail to provide sufficient funds in time to avoid significant
overcrowding; the best way to avoid such overcrowding is to adopt the
conservative assumption that no further prison expansion will be provided beyond what the legislature has already funded.
The assumption of no further growth in capacity encourages the sentencing commission and other policymakers to explore alternatives to incarceration that may be just as effective, and are almost always cheaper
and more humane.13 2 Such an assumption, coupled with sophisticated
resource impact projections, also encourages policymakers to debate and
make decisions openly about priorities in the use of limited resources.
And it forces advocates of greater severity, both within the commission
and outside it, to take responsibility for the fiscal impact of their proposals, in terms of increased taxes and reduced penalties for other
offenders. 133
Most of these benefits are unavailable under the federal approach,
which does not use resource impact assessments to formulate policy or set
priorities. Instead, policy is made without regard to cost, then projections
are made and Congress is told to pay the bill. This approach may be one
reason for the dramatic escalation in federal prison populations under
the guidelines-far greater than the rate of growth in the states, espe13 4
cially in guidelines states.
Minnesota-style resource impact assessments have proven to be an
effective means to control prison population growth, but their impor132. See Norval Morris & Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation:
Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System 37-81 (1990) (arguing that
incarceration and other types of punishment are often interchangeable).
133. See Dale G. Parent, Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of
Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines 43-44 (1988) (describing how capacity constraints
forced legislators to view prison space as "scarce resource to be allocated rationally").
134. From 1988 to 2003, the federal per capita incarceration rate more than tripled,

whereas the increase in state per capita incarceration rates over the same period was less
than double. See Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, NCJ 205335, Bulletin:
Prisoners in 2003, at 4 tbl.4 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
p03.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, NCJ 116315, Bulletin: Prisoners in 1988, at 2 tbl.2 (1989); see also Frase,
Retrospective, supra note 8, at 75 (noting federal annual growth rate was almost twice as
high as rate in guidelines states that emphasized resource management goals); Thomas B.
Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 696, 697 (1995) (states emphasizing correctional management had lower
than average prison growth rates); Jon Sorensen & Don Stemen, The Effect of State
Sentencing Policies on Incarceration Rates, 48 Crime & Delinquency 456, 465-66 (2002)
(guidelines states had lower imprisonment rates); Kevin R. Reitz, Questioning the

Conventional Wisdom of Parole Release Authority, in The Future of Imprisonment, supra
note 96, at 199, 224 [hereinafter Reitz, Conventional Wisdom] (parole abolition states had
lower prison growth rates).
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tance goes beyond resource management. In a recent article, Professor
Rachel Barkow argues convincingly that such assessments are critical to
the survival of sentencing commissions because they allow commissions to
1 35
provide politically and publicly acceptable administrative expertise.
In fact, there are several other important types of commission expertise that may be just as important and politically saleable. A sentencing
commission can help the legislature set punishment priorities based on
analysis of social harms associated with different crimes, evaluation of
available means to combat those harms, and careful analysis of complex
systemic interactions and trade-offs. For example, faced with a proposed
three strikes law or mandatory minimum statute, a commission, working
with outside researchers, could gather and present available data from
other jurisdictions, showing the limited crime control benefits of such a
law.' 3 6 Commissions could also collect and report data on more costeffective alternative crime preventive measures within l3 7 and outside
of' 38 the criminal justice system. Of course, additional tasks require additional funding. But well-designed crime control cost-effectiveness studies
pay for themselves and may even receive budget priority. Commissions
may also be able to call on foundations and university researchers for
financial or staffing assistance. Many commissions are sitting on a large
store of criminal justice data that would be of great interest to such
researchers.
B.

Wat Guidelines Enforcement Mechanisms Are Needed?

Experience with judicially imposed guidelines in the 1970s led many
observers to conclude that voluntary guidelines have little if any effect.13 9
But eight guidelines jurisdictions have voluntary guidelines, and four of
the five states with guidelines awaiting legislative approval (Alabama,
Georgia, Oklahoma, and South Carolina) are proposing only voluntary
standards. The most recent jurisdiction to adopt the voluntary approach,
Washington, D.C., noted that some states with voluntary guidelines report
135. Barkow, supra note 23, at 804-10.
136. See Frase, Proportionality, supra note 97, at 642 n.307 (summarizing research on
California three strikes law).
137. Some guidelines enabling statutes instruct the commission to assess the cost
effectiveness of correctional programs. See Barkow, supra note 23, at 784 & n.287
(discussing North Carolina enabling statute); Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 74, at
166-68 (discussing Virginia legislature's directives to commission to conduct risk
assessment studies).
138. Some states have a government agency doing this kind of research. For example,
the Washington State Institute for Public Policy has information on its website, at http://
www.wsipp.wa.gov, listing cost-benefit evaluations of early childhood intervention and
other prevention programs, as well as criminal justice policies. Similar studies of the costeffectiveness of prevention programs have been carried out at the Rand Corporation. See
Rand Corp., Child Policy Research Area, at http://www.rand.org/child/projects/ .
bstprctshtml (last modified Dec. 1, 2004).
139. Tonry, Structured Sentencing, supra note 17, at 282.
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substantial compliance rates, and concluded that any additional compliance produced by formal enforcement mechanisms would be outweighed
by the cost of those mechanisms and the concomitant loss ofjudicial flexibility.1 40 As discussed in Part II, decisions about guidelines enforcement
and the degree of flexibility built into the guidelines themselves involve
fundamental normative questions about the relative importance of values
associated with greater uniformity, such as general deterrence, and those
promoted by case-specific sentencing, such as offender risk management.
These normative issues also raise empirical questions about the extent to
which different purposes are served by varying degrees of uniformity or
flexibility.
As noted earlier, there are several varieties of voluntary guidelines,
and also several ways of enforcing guidelines recommendations. Some
voluntary guidelines require judges to state reasons for departure; such
reasons facilitate appellate review, but even with highly deferential review, or none at all, the exercise of stating reasons may help trial judges
to clarify their assumptions and reasoning.1 4 1 Prior to Booker, some observers had suggested that a reasons requirement might render an otherwise voluntary guidelines system subject to Blakely attack, but that concern
42
now seems unwarranted. 1
As for enforcement mechanisms, appellate review is the most common device, but it can mean many things-from review that is so deferential as to be ineffectual, to review that is so intrusive it denies trial courts
the flexibility they need to accommodate case-specific circumstances and
experiment with different approaches. 143 Appellate review is not the only
way to enforce guidelines rules; publishing judge-specific departure rates
also tends to discourage judges from departing.1 44 There may also be
ways to increase the power of peer pressure, at least within a small court;
internal publication of departure rates is one example.
140. D.C. Advisory Comm'n on Sentencing, 2003 Annual Report 18-21 (2003),
available at http://acs.dc.gov/acs/cwp/view,a,3,q,591664.asp (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
141. Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 7.XX cmt. e (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004).
142. See Wool & Stemen, supra note 11, at 5-9 (arguing voluntary systems may be
subject to Blakely if judges must state reasons for departure). This interpretation seems
doubtful in light of Justice Breyer's opinion in Booker. If guidelines subject to
reasonableness review are still deemed voluntary and Blakely-compliant, United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-69 (2005) (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court), it is unclear why a
requirement of reasons, with or without any appellate review, would present more difficult
Blakely problems. See also Benge v. State, No. 137, 2004 Del. Lexis 506, at *2 (Nov. 12,
2004) (holding Blakely inapplicable to Delaware guidelines, even though judges in that
state must state reasons for departure); Wool & Stemen, supra note 11, at 5. As noted
earlier, it is very unclear what Justice Breyer means by "reasonableness" review or how this
standard compares with the appellate review standards that have evolved in guidelines
states authorizing sentence appeals. See supra text accompanying note 45.
143. See generally Reitz, Sentence Appeals, supra note 41.
144. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania and
Washington experience).
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Which of these approaches is best? One issue that seems beyond
dispute is that only a guidelines system with meaningful appellate review
can develop a body of case law that interprets guidelines and statutory
provisions and further develops sentencing policy in light of concrete
cases andjudicial experience, as common law courts have done for centuries in other areas of the law.1 45 Appellate review also promotes greater
transparency and accountability of sentencing decisions.1 46 Furthermore, appellate review will likely be the most effective means to promote
compliance, especially in large jurisdictions and jurisdictions with guidelines that seek to change existing practice. Higher compliance rates, in
turn, reduce unjustified disparities and permit more accurate resource
impact assessments. However, it should be noted that such assessments
are made by a number of states with voluntary guidelines; 147 these jurisdictions apparently believe that their assessments are sufficiently accurate
to provide information of some use to policymakers. On the other hand,
there is some evidence suggesting that prison populations have escalated
148
more sharply in states with voluntary guidelines.
More research is needed on all of these points, but the first challenge will be to develop measures permitting valid cross-jurisdictional
comparisons of guidelines compliance rates. At present such rates are
not comparable because they reflect major differences in legal definitions
of what constitutes a departure. For example, probationary sentences
given to certain first offenders would be deemed departures in Minne1 49
sota, but not in Washington.
C. Should ParoleRelease Discretion Be Retainedfor Some or All Offenders?
A minority of existing state guidelines systems retain parole release
discretion for all felons sentenced to prison, and several other states retain it for certain crimes. There are several potential advantages to parole retention:
(1) States can allocate limited prison beds to the most dangerous
offenders.
(2) Prison durations can be modified to reflect changed circumstances that could not be, or were not, foreseen at the time of original
sentencing and that may make the original sentence unnecessary from a
public safety standpoint. Examples of such changed circumstances include successful treatment or training in prison, maturation, genuine repentance, and changes in the offender's health, family, or neighborhood
environment. Such reassessments of the continuing need for custody
seem especially important for offenders serving very long prison terms.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Reitz, Sentencing Conundrum, supra note 10, at 1114.
See id. (discussing importance of "meaningful" appellate review).
Barkow, supra note 23, at 796 & n.359.
Reitz, Sentencing Conundrum, supra note 10, at 1115 & fig.2.
Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States, supra note 23, at 127.
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(3) Sentence durations may be tailored to general deterrence needs
dictated by current crime patterns, and lower-risk offenders can be re150
leased early when necessary to avoid prison overcrowding.
However, there are also many disadvantages of discretionary parole
release, which led to its abolition in most guidelines systems and in many
nonguidelines states. Parole discretion defeats or seriously undercuts a
number of important sentencing goals, in particular:
(1) Unequal penalties are imposed on equally deserving offenders
(those who have committed the same offense, with similar prior records)
who are deemed to pose different levels of risk; indeed, it is almost inevitable that some offenders who are identical in level of risk as well as desert will be treated differently as a result of human error or systemic flaws.
Parole release guidelines can ameliorate problems of disparity, but they
inevitably reduce flexibility and the benefits that parole release discretion
purports to serve.
(2) Highly discretionary release interferes with the general deterrent
and expressive functions of sentences, and early release undercuts the
goal of truth in sentencing.
(3) Discretionary release reduces the predictability of prison

sentences, which makes it much more difficult to forecast the cost of particular sentencing rules. Without accurate resource impact assessments,
legislators and commission members need not take responsibility for the
costs of their proposals, and are tempted to increase prison terms while
claiming that the full penalty will not have to be served; the result may be
a spiral of steadily increasing announced penalties, with a steady decrease
5
in the proportion of the prison term actually served.' '
Further research is needed to determine whether the disadvantages
of parole retention, with and without parole guidelines, outweigh the advantages. A critical issue is whether parole release risk assessments, based
on inmate behavior and attitudes in prison as well as group base expectancy rates, are significantly more reliable today than they were twentyfive years ago when parole release discretion fell out of favor. 152 One
issue as to which there is already considerable evidence is the relationship
between parole abolition and rates of prison population growth: Parole
abolition states-especially those with sentencing guidelines-tend to
153
have lower-than-average growth rates.
Parole abolition is not an all-or-nothing proposition; some guidelines
states have retained parole release discretion for certain offenders. In
Minnesota, for example, first degree murder carries a mandatory penalty

150. See Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 723, 724
(1993) ("[T]he goal of matching sentences to resources can best be implemented through
administrative mechanisms at the back end of the criminal justice system.").
151. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States, supra note 23, at 126.
152. See generally 16 Fed. Sent'g Rep., No. 3 (Feb. 2004) (issue devoted to "Risk
Assessment: Methodologies and Application").
153. Reitz, Conventional Wisdom, supra note 134, at 220-24.
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of life imprisonment, with parole eligibility after thirty years. 1 5 4 But there
have been several recent proposals to greatly expand the number of offenders eligible for lengthy prison terms subject to parole release. Reacting to a highly publicized case of kidnaping and murder allegedly committed by a released sex offender, legislators and the sentencing
guidelines commission have proposed to give some or all sex offenders
indeterminate sentences subject to parole discretion. 1 55 An alternative
"new parole" proposal is aimed not at incapacitating dangerous offenders
but rather as a back-end safety valve to allow for exceptional, changed
circumstances. 15 6 Some other parole abolition states already have substantial numbers of parole eligible offenders. 1 5 7 Further research should
be conducted in these states to see how well this hybrid approach works.
An argument in its favor is that risk assessments are more reliable for
certain types of offenders. 158 On the other hand, it seems likely that such
islands of indeterminacy within a guidelines system may expand over
time.
Another set of parole retention issues involves the relationship between judicial guidelines and parole release: In some parole retention
states, the judge's sentence determines the minimum prison term before
parole eligibility, while in other states it determines the maximum or the
recommended term. 159 In minimum-term jurisdictions, the maximum
may be determined by statute1 60 or by a formula keyed to the minimum;
in maximum-term jurisdictions, statutes or parole board policies may determine the earliest date of parole eligibility. As noted at the outset, one
potential advantage of the former approach is that it may insulate a legally binding guidelines system from Blakely attack. Minimum-term
guidelines may also raise fewer truth-in-sentencing issues, at least if the
primary concern, particularly of crime victims, is with offenders serving
much less than the prison term announced by the sentencing judge. On
the other hand, maximum-term guidelines have at least one very important advantage. Setting a case-specific maximum sentence encourages
trial courts to address an issue that tends to be obscured by a minimumterm procedure: What is the highest penalty the defendant deserves?
This is a critical issue from a limiting retributive perspective, with its
strong emphasis on avoiding disproportionately severe punishment.

154. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244.05(4) (West 2004).
155. Frase, Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 33, at 211-12.
156. Conrad deFiebre, Bills Reduce Prison Terms to Save Cash: One Lets Inmates out
Early; Another Cuts Drug Sentences, Star Tribune (Minneapolis), Mar. 15, 2004, at BI.
157. See, e.g., Carns, supra note 29, at 134 (Alaska).
158. See Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 74, at 168-69 (discussing Virginia's
selective use of risk assessment for certain types of offenders).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
160. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of Corr., supra note 48 (maximum set by statute).
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D. How Should the Use of Intermediate Sanctions Be Addressed?
Regulation of the use of intermediate sanctions can serve a number
of valuable functions, 16 1 and many guidelines systems now include this
feature in some form. Still, no jurisdiction regulates probation conditions and other intermediate sanctions as much as it regulates prison
sentences. In part, this may be because prison and nonprison sentences
are intended to serve different purposes, with the purposes served by
nonprison sentences requiring assessment of offender characteristics and
other case-specific factors not suited to close regulation. For example,
the Minnesota guidelines state that the proper penal objectives to be considered in establishing conditions of stayed prison sentences include "retribution, rehabilitation, public protection, restitution, deterrence, and
public condemnation of criminal conduct."'1 6 2 The guidelines further
provide that "the relative importance of these objectives may vary with
both offense and offender characteristics," and that "multiple objectives
may be present in any given sentence."' 16 3 In other words, the guidelines
view the use of intermediate sanctions the way the use of prison sanctions
was viewed under indeterminate sentencing. In contrast, prison terms
are closely regulated under the guidelines: When addressing the imposition and duration of such terms, the guidelines contain no comparable
statement of multiple sentencing purposes or the need for individualized
assessment.
Another reason not to regulate intermediate sanctions is that, in
Minnesota and most other guidelines states, these sanctions are usually
carried out and paid for at the local rather than state level. Greater flexibility in the use of such sanctions permits state guidelines systems to take
account of differences in local corrections resources, local values, and
local crime problems. In contrast, there is a greater need to set statewide
priorities in the use of state prison resources, and data on the capacity
and historical use of such resources is more available and easier to collect. Moreover, when offenders are sent to state-run prisons, any disparities in local sentencing decisions are more apparent and troubling.
Many of these problems would be lessened or avoided if it were possible to devise a point system or set of exchange rates for the various nonprison sanction options-including jail terms, since they are also served
and paid for locally and are often combined with noncustodial sanctions.
The idea would be to define a range of sanction severity for each nonprison cell in the guidelines grid, or for each group of presumptive nonprison cases in systems without a grid, scaled to maintain ordinal proportionality.' 64 The range could be stated in terms of a single sanction type
161. See supra text accompanying note 80.
162. Minn. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 55, § III.A.2.
163. Id.
164. See generally Morris & Tonry, supra note 132, at 56-108 (discussing
interchangeability of punishments and exchange rates); von Hirsch, Philosophy of
Punishment, supra note 120, at 80 (discussing interchangeability of punishments within
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(jail days, day fines, etc.), with exchange rates permitting other sanction
types to be substituted. Alternatively, the ranges could be stated in terms
of punishment severity points, with a defined number of points for each
unit of each sanction type. Using these exchange rates or point systems,
judges would be allowed to impose any combination of sanction types
provided that the overall punitiveness of the sentence falls within the permissible severity range-or the judge departs from the guidelines.
However, narrow severity ranges for nonprison sentences are problematic.' 65 It is very difficult to develop consensus on precise exchange
rates for all types of sanctions. 166 Minimum severity requirements are
particularly difficult to enforce consistently when practitioners feel that
such severity serves no practical purpose. In practice, minimum severity
standards are weakly enforced, since the only party with standing to object or appeal-the prosecutor-often agrees to the downward departure
as part of a plea bargain. 167 To the extent that such minimum requirements could be enforced, this would make the sentencing system much
more complex, contrary to the goal of simplicity. Such requirements
would increase the number of probation conditions imposed, which in
turn would increase the frequency of probation violations and revocations, thus overloading local resources and violating legitimate local value
choices. Finally, since felony intermediate sanctions overlap substantially
with typical misdemeanor sentences that remain unregulated in most
state guidelines systems,1 68 regulating the former but not the latter would
produce serious proportionality problems.
It is therefore not surprising that no state has yet adopted a regime
as restrictive as the point range or exchange rate systems described above.
Some states limit the duration of jail sentences' 69 or seek to provide guidance on the use of various intermediate sanctions. 1 70 The states that
follow the latter approach classify all sanction types into three or more
groups-custody, restrictive intermediate (RI), and less restrictive intermediate (LRI)-and specify, for each grid cell, which of these three types
limits of ordinal proportionality); Andrew von Hirsch et al., Punishments in the
Community and the Principles of Desert, 20 Rutgers L.J. 595, 600-09 (1989) (same).
165. Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 96, at 423-25.
166. See von Hirsch et al., supra note 164, at 603 (noting difficulty of making
comparisons of severity across a large variety of possible sanctions).
167. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 96, at 93-94.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 176-178.
169. For example, the Washington, Oregon, and Pennsylvania guidelines grids
contain numerous cells with recommended felony level custody sentences of less than one
year. Or. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 51, appx. 1, sentencing guidelines grid; Pa.
Sentencing Guidelines § 303.16 (2004), codified at 204 Pa. Code § 303.16 (2004), available
at http://pcs.la.psu.edu (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) [hereinafter Pa. Sentencing
Guidelines] (basic sentencing matrix); Wash. Adult Sentencing Guidelines Manual appx.
C (2004), available at http://www.sgc.wa.gov/PUBS/Manual_2004/ManO4-Section-IV.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (sentencing grid).
170. The states that have done the most in this regard appear to be Delaware, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
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may be used. However, these systems provide little guidance about the
choice between sanction types when, as is often the case, more than one
type is allowed. 171 Nor do they recommend, for noncustodial sanctions,
how much of that sanction to impose.
Nevertheless, more experimentation and research needs to be done
on these matters. Certain forms of regulation or partial regulation may
be much more feasible and desirable than others. In particular, guidelines systems should seriously consider imposing upper presumptive limits on the use of the most severe nonprison sanctions. Such an "asymmetric" limitation is consistent with a central tenet of the limiting
retributivism model endorsed in Part II and clearly evident in the Minnesota system-that it is especially important to prevent disproportionately
severe punishments. 172 Setting upper limits on intermediate sanction severity also serves to avoid overloading local correctional resources. Oregon provides a working example of this severity-capping approach: For
each grid cell with a presumptive nonprison sentence, the guidelines
specify a presumptive upper limit on the maximum number of "sanction
units" (including jail, residential treatment, home detention, and community service), and also a presumptive maximum number of jail days
173
that may be imposed.
Whether or not guidelines regulate the use of intermediate sanctions, the use of such sanctions can and should be promoted by providing
state resources to establish and expand their availability at the local level.
Several guidelines states have already done so. 174 This strategy not only
gives judges much needed sentencing options, it may actually save the
state money in the long run. When local sentencing resources are limited and paid for by local governments, judges are encouraged to send
offenders to prison, at the state's expense, a phenomenon which Zimring
and Hawkins have dubbed the "correctional free lunch." 175 Even if an
offender is kept in the community, inadequate funding of local correctional programs increases the odds that he or she will fail on probation or
reoffend, and "graduate" to the state prison system.
171. North Carolina permits a noncustody sentence in 34 of its 54 felony grid cells,
but precludes custody in only 3 of these cells (1 of which requires LRI). N.C. Sentencing
Manual, supra note 65, at 2 fig.A (prescribing levels of punishment for felonies).
Pennsylvania permits a noncustody sentence in 19 of its 104 grid cells (including
misdemeanors), but precludes custody in only 2 of these cells (both of which require LRI).
Pa. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 169, § 303.16 (basic sentencing matrix).
172. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 96, at 92; Frase, Sentencing Principles,
supra note 96, at 366-68.
173. One day spent in any of these sanctions counts as one unit, except for
community service, which requires sixteen hours per unit. Or. Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 51, R 213-005-0012.
174. See, e.g., Robin L. Lubitz, Recent History of Sentencing Reform in North
Carolina, 6 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 129, 132 (1993); Fritz Rauschenberg, Ohio Guidelines Take
Effect, Overcrowded Times, Aug. 1997, at 1, 10.
175. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 129, at 140, 211-15.
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E. How Important Is It to Regulate MisdemeanorSentences?
All but a handful of state guidelines systems are limited to felony
crimes. In those states, sentencing of most misdemeanor offenses continues to be governed by a version of indeterminate sentencing. In some of
these jurisdictions, however, the least serious violations are subject to a
determinate sentencing regime-scheduled fines payable at a violations
bureau or other administrative agency.1 76 Having guidelines for the most
serious and the most petty offenses might seem anomalous, but it is not.
For traffic and other minor, high volume offenses, the purposes of punishment are primarily deterrent; case-specific factors are less important,
and the potential for serious disparity is limited. For more serious misdemeanor crimes, the more varied sentencing purposes and wider range of
penalties require a more individualized approach, just as appears to be
true in the sentencing of lesser felonies for which alternative sanctions
177
are appropriate.
But the substantial overlap between serious misdemeanor and minor
felony sentencing poses its own problems. Since typical misdemeanor
sentences (jail, home detention, probation, fines, community service, restitution) overlap substantially with typical conditions of probation in felony cases, misdemeanor and felony sentences are competing for the same
limited correctional resources, which are usually paid for by local government. Moreover, failure to regulate sentences in misdemeanor cases can
mean that some of these offenders receive more severe sentences than
many felons, raising serious problems of sentencing disparity. Such inconsistent treatment may also fail to provide sufficient marginal deterrence by eliminating any incentive to commit the lesser crime, 178 and
may fail to achieve expressive or educative goals of defining and reinforcing attitudes about the relative seriousness of different crimes. Moreover,
since felony offenders have often received prior misdemeanor sentences
and vice versa, unregulated misdemeanor sentencing may cause different
parts of the system to work at cross purposes.
A few jurisdictions do regulate misdemeanor sentences. Research is
needed into how the misdemeanor sentence recommendations are written and applied, and how misdemeanor and felony sentencing practices
and resources interact. Such research will help to better coordinate these
two separate sentencing systems, and may also provide ideas for improved
regulation of intermediate sanctions in felony cases.
As with intermediate sanctions in felony sentencing, the funding of
misdemeanor sentencing options is often inadequate. Although the "correctional free lunch" problem is less acute, states may find that state fund176. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice, supra note 1, at 647.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 161-163.
178. The marginal deterrence argument was used by early utilitarian writers Beccaria
and Bentham to argue in favor of sentences proportionate to crime seriousness. See Frase,
Proportionality, supra note 97, at 593.
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ing of expanded misdemeanor sentencing options saves the state money
in the long term by lowering the number of minor offenders who "graduate" to the state system, and perhaps also by encouraging prosecutors to
forego felony charges.
F. How Should Revocation of Probation and PostprisonRelease Be Regulated?
Another issue closely related to the previous two is whether and how
to regulate decisions to revoke, release, or substantially modify the terms
of release. The revocation issue arises in two very different contextsone involving offenders who were placed on probation, and the other
involving offenders who were sent to prison (initially, or upon revocation
of probation) and then released from custody. In addition, different
agencies may make the revocation/modification decision. In the probation context, probation officers may be authorized to make minor adjustments, with sentencing judges deciding whether to revoke or make substantial changes in release conditions.1 79 Postprison release issues are
usually decided by a parole or other corrections board and its agents. In
either case, however, release conditions and alleged violations are similar,
and there is a similar range of dispositional options.
As noted previously, regulation of revocation decisions serves a number of important functions, including reduction of disparity, avoiding unnecessary imprisonment, and improving public safety.18 0 Indeed, the
need for closer regulation is becoming critical; a substantial and increasing percentage of prison admissions in many states result from revocation
of release rather than direct commitment following conviction.18 1 However, only about half of the guidelines systems appear to regulate any
aspect of probation or parole revocation or modification. Few jurisdictions regulate probation decisions, and those that do impose only vague
or rudimentary standards. For instance, the Delaware guidelines define
five levels of increasingly intrusive sanctions; judges and corrections officials decide when an offender should move up or down the ladder, based
on his or her behavior while on release.' 8 2 The Minnesota guidelines
state that probation revocation "should not be undertaken lightly and...
should not be a reflexive reaction to technical violations" of release conditions, even in more serious cases. 18 3 The guidelines further recommend "great restraint" in imprisoning released offenders who were origi179. Del. Benchbook, supra note 52, at 59-60.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
181. Frase, Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 33, at 197 (noting that by 2001 almost
half of prison admissions were for violation of release conditions); Reitz, Conventional
Wisdom, supra note 134, at 214 tbl.8.1 (showing that in 1999 parole revocation alone
accounted for sixty-seven percent of prison admissions in California; rates in other states
ranged from seven to forty-one percent, averaging twenty-one percent).
182. The first three levels are administrative, field, and intensive supervision; level
four is part-time incarceration (nine or more hours per day), and level five is full-time
incarceration. Del. Benchbook, supra note 52, at 5, 59-60.
183. Minn. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 55, § III.B.
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nally convicted of "low severity offenses" or who have "short" prior
records; instead, the commission recommends shifting to "more restrictive and onerous" probation conditions, including "periods of local confinement," i.e., jail time.1 8 4 The Commission views revocation to prison
as justified when (1) the offender has been convicted of a new crime
carrying a presumptive executed prison term; or (2) the defendant "persists" in violating probation conditions despite prior escalation of the severity of release conditions.' 8 5
Another regulatory approach is to set presumptive targets or upper
limits on the duration of the custodial term that may be imposed if release is revoked. The Minnesota guidelines permit substantial prison
terms to be imposed if probation is revoked, scaled to the seriousness of
the original conviction offense and the offender's prior record.18 6 Other
jurisdictions permit-or in some cases, require-only shorter jail terms,
unless the offender has received a new conviction and is sentenced under
18 7
the guidelines for that offense.
A few guidelines jurisdictions regulate decisions to revoke or modify
parole or other postprison release,' 88 but most do not, probably for the
same reasons that probation revocation and modification are often not
closely regulated-these decisions are viewed as case specific and based
on crime control considerations; uniformity, proportionality, and predictability values are not given much weight here.
Since revocations of probation and postprison release account for
significant proportions of prison admissions in many states, closer regulation of these decisions seems desirable.' 8 9 Whether such regulation is
feasible is another question, which should be addressed by examining the
varying rules and experiences in jurisdictions that have tried to impose
limits on these discretionary decisions.
G. Should ProsecutorialDiscretion and CooperationBargainingBe Regulated?
Charging and plea bargaining decisions have the potential to undercut guidelines reforms by allowing unregulated decisions by prosecutors
and defense attorneys to determine in what grid "cell" the offender ends
up, which in turn determines the presumptive sentence. Although attorneys clearly bargain "in the shadow" of the guidelines, producing out184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. § IV (sentencing grid); Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 96, at 410.
187. For example, the federal guidelines define three grades of probation and
supervised release violation, with ranges of presumptively required custody terms
(depending on criminal history) running from three to nine months to fifty-one to sixtythree months. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 7Bl.1-7B1.5 (2004).
188. Almost all states that have abolished parole still have periods of postrelease
supervision, for example, the "supervised release term" in Minnesota, consisting of the
good time credit earned in prison-up to one-third of the maximum prison sentence
authorized by the trial court. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244.05 (West 2003).
189. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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comes which tend to mirror the results the law would impose without
negotiation, 190 many case-specific factors, including unequal resources
and bargaining ability and differentials in risk aversion, inevitably produce results at odds with guidelines rules and policies. Among the guidelines states, only Washington has addressed this issue, and its statewide
charging guidelines are not legally enforceable. 9 1
The federal guidelines went too far in the opposite direction, attempting to limit the effects of charging leniency by providing presumptively binding enhancements for "relevant conduct"1 92 even if that conduct is not charged or retained to conviction-indeed, even if it is based
on charges of which the defendant was acquitted, so long as the sentencing judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was
committed. Such "real-offense" sentencing has been severely criticized by
scholars, 193 and presumptive relevant conduct enhancements are now
unconstitutional under Blakely and Booker (barring one of the "fixes" described in the Introduction). 194
Another prosecution tool under the federal guidelines, and one that
is not affected by Blakely, is the power of the government to grant or deny
mitigation to offenders based on whether they are deemed to have provided "substantial assistance" in the form of testimony or other cooperation in obtaining convictions of other offenders.' 95 Although prosecutors also bargained for such cooperation before there were guidelines,
judges had discretion to mitigate sentences of cooperating defendants
even if the prosecution did not agree.
Can prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, and cooperation bargaining be subjected to meaningful and effective control? Perhaps not.
The absence of any serious attempt by state guidelines systems to regulate
these matters reflects the extraordinary difficulty of enforcing such controls in an adversary system. It is particularly difficult to impose lower limits on charging severity and recommended sentence leniency since, in
most cases, neither the prosecution nor the defense will appeal cases of
leniency.
But maybe the problem is not that serious, at least in well-designed
guidelines systems. Unlike the federal system, there have been relatively
few complaints about prosecutorial dominance in state systems,1 96 so per190. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (suggesting law provides framework
within which parties reach negotiated settlements).

191. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 35, at 89-90, 96-97.
192. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3.
193. See, e.g., Tonry, Sentencing Matters, supra note 5, at 68, 77-78, 90, 93-95; Kevin
R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 523, 573
(1993).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
195. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1.
196. It is, of course, hard to document the absence of something. However, one
indication of the lack of concern in the states about prosecutorial discretion is that this
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haps closer regulation is not needed. Specifically, my hypothesis is that,
in a properly balanced guidelines system-one with reasonable sentence
severity levels and few mandatory minimum statutes, and in which courts
retain substantial discretion to depart-it is rare that prosecutorial or
plea bargaining decisions force judges to impose sentences with which
the judges strongly disagree, as often seems to have occurred in federal
courts. To some extent, this is a testable hypothesis. Research could
measure the degree and nature ofjudicial, defense, and probation officer
complaints about charging, plea bargaining, and cooperation bargaining
in different state guidelines systems, and seek to determine whether these
complaints are associated with the various forms of balance, or imbalance, mentioned above. It seems likely that complaints will be much
more frequent in jurisdictions with severe statutory or presumptive
sentences for certain crimes (particularly mandatory penalties), broad
three strikes laws or other criminal record enhancements, and outdated,
overlapping, or otherwise overbroad criminal prohibitions.
H. Other Important Design Issues
The summary above includes only a few of the important design issues that guidelines drafters and revisers must address. Some other important issues include the structure and powers of the sentencing commission-its makeup, legislative mandate, and relationship to other
branches of state government; 19 7 the use of a single sentencing grid, multiple grids, or a nongrid ("narrative") format; the extent to which guidelines rules reflect existing norms ("historical" or descriptive guidelines)
rather than independent ("prescriptive") policy choices of the legislature
or commission; whether guidance is provided as to the choice of sentencing purposes or the relationship between certain purposes and certain
sentencing options; the use of categorical presumptions as to risk, amenability, or desert for groups of offenders, rather than individualized assessments; and the relationship between sentencing law reform and criminal
code reform.
CONCLUSION

The varied approaches of state guidelines reforms provide state and
federal sentencing policymakers with a broad range of options. At the
same time, these varied approaches-and similar choices of what not to
regulate-raise many important policy issues that theoretical and empirical researchers need to address. In all likelihood there is no "ideal" sentencing guidelines model; rather, each state must choose a combination
of design features and policy goals appropriate to its local circumstances
topic has been rarely discussed in meetings and newsletters of the National Association of
Sentencing Commissions (an organization that focuses on state guidelines). See NASC
Website, supra note 20.
197. See Barkow, supra note 23, passim.
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and political realities. What is needed, and what this Essay hopes to facilitate, is a growing understanding of what tends to work best under different circumstances, the reasons why that is so, the nature of the unresolved policy choices states face, and the most profitable avenues of
future research to facilitate these policy and design choices.
Are sentencing guidelines the best way to achieve all of the varied
purposes and limitations of punishment in the early twenty-first century?
As I have argued elsewhere, it is unlikely that these purposes and limitations can be accommodated by any of the alternative sentencing regimes,
whether indeterminate sentencing, highly determinate sentencing, a desert model with interchangeable sanction types, or emerging models such
as restorative justice, community justice, and sentencing based on offender risk management.1 9 8 But sentencing guidelines of the kind implemented in the states provide sufficient flexibility to achieve all contemporary sentencing, reform, and systemic goals-including increased use of
intermediate sanctions, restorative and community justice programs, and
offender risk management. Guidelines have proved popular in the states
not just as a means of limiting unjustified disparities, but also as a way to
manage prison population growth, avoid overcrowding, and set priorities
in the use of limited and expensive correctional resources. The purposes
served by state guidelines have evolved considerably over the past quarter
century and will continue to evolve and incorporate new theories and
conditions.
Thus, there is reason to believe that sentencing guidelines will continue to thrive and spread in the states, and will be modified as little as
possible to comply with the demands of Blakely. In any case, it seems
likely that the Blakely revolution will cause scholars to pay more attention
to the critical normative and empirical issues underlying the design and
operations of guidelines sentencing, and the huge store of data and experience to be found in a quarter century of guidelines reform in the states.
198. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 96, at 107-11; Frase, Retrospective,
supra note 8, at 78-80.

